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CONFIRMATION HEARINGS OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE REHNQUIST NATURAL
COURT
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INTRODUCTION
The interpretive or judicial philosophies of Supreme Court
Justices can be thought of as "packages of beliefs" about how to
interpret the law, packages that go by names like formalism,
originalism, and textualism.' Given the reasonable assumption
that a judge's judicial philosophy could matter for how he or she
will decide cases, the judicial philosophy of a nominee to the Su-
preme Court is of great interest to members of the Senate who
vote on a nominee's confirmation. Figuring out a nominee's ju-
dicial philosophy is, consequently, one purpose of the confirma-
tion hearings in the Senate, and Senators often claim to base
their votes on their assessments of a nominee's judicial philoso-
phy. During Justice Ginsburg's hearings, for example, Senator
Joseph Biden, then chair of the Judiciary Committee, said the
following: "A Senator has not only the right, but the duty to
weigh carefully a nominee's judicial philosophy and, even more
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1. See Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Em-
pirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 850 (2006).
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importantly, the consequences of that philosophy for the coun-
try. ,2
Many Supreme Court observers believe, however, that
nominees reveal little useful information at their confirmation
hearings.' While an occasional nominee (such as Robert Bork)
will discuss his or her views in detail, most nominees are more
guarded.4 Nominees repeatedly refuse to answer specific ques-
tions, or to disclose information about how they would vote in
particular cases. For example, Sandra Day O'Connor refused to
state how she "might vote on a particular issue which may come
up before the Court," and additionally declined to "endorse or
criticize specific Suprem[e] Court decisions presenting issues
which may well come before the Court again."5 Ruth Bader
Ginsburg said, "[a] judge sworn to decide impartially can offer
no forecast, no hints, for that would show not only disregard for
the specifics of the particular case, it would display disdain for
the entire judicial process."6 Antonin Scalia even resisted ques-
tions about whether Marbury v. Madison represents a settled
principle of law.7
Obviously, what types of questions the Senators should
ask-or the nominees should answer-is far from clear. Few,
2. The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.
114 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearings].
3. See, e.g., Grover Rees I11, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirma-
tion Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913, 918 (1983); William G.
Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation Hearings:
Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the
Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. 109, 109 (1987). See generally Todd L. Wheeler, I Can't: Ethi-
cal Responses and the Roberts Confirmation Hearings, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1067
(2006).
4. See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 96-97 (2005).
5. Rees, supra note 3, at 919 (quoting The Nomination of Judge Sandra Day
O'Connor of Arizona to Serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 57 (1981) [hereinafter
O'Connor Hearings]).
6. Wheeler, supra note 3, at 1077 (quoting Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 2) (al-
teration in original).
7. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. at
33-34, 83-84, 88 (1986) [hereinafter Scalia Hearings]. Other nominees were not so coy
about Marbury. See, e.g., The Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 93 (1987) [hereafter Kennedy Hearings] (statement of Judge Kennedy)
("Marbury v. Madison is one of the essential structural elements of the Constitution of
the United States. As we all know, the doctrine of judicial review is not explicit in the
Constitution. I have very little trouble finding that it was intended.").
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however, disapprove of questions about a nominee's judicial phi-
losophy. Consider Senator Specter's comments during Ken-
nedy's hearings:
On the subject of judicial philosophy, our introductory state-
ments today have already negated to some extent the conclu-
sion of harmony in these hearings. You have already heard a
fair difference of views. And the first question I asked of you
when you and I sat down to talk-and I thank you for the al-
most 3 hours we spent together in two extensive sessions. The
first question I asked you was whether you thought that judi-
cial philosophy was an appropriate subject for inquiry. You
said you thought that it was, and we proceeded to talk. And I
did not ask you about your views on any specific cases, and I
would not in private or in public. But I do believe that there
are broad parameters which are appropriate for discussion.8
During these same hearings, Senator Leahy described this in-
quiry into judicial philosophy as the most important one at the
hearings, saying that "[n]o issue is more central to a decision on
the appointment of a Justice."9 And while some Senators have
expressed reservations about the scope of questions relating to
judicial philosophy,' as Senator Specter's comment suggests,
8. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 7, at 68. Specter then went on to describe a simi-
lar experience with Robert Bork: "That was the first question I asked of Judge Bork as
well, whether he thought judicial-we were talking about judicial ideology at that time,
and Judge Bork said in response that he did not like the term 'ideology' because it had
political connotations, but he thought judicial philosophy was an appropriate subject for
inquiry." /d.
9. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 7, at 59. Leahy described the term "judicial phi-
losophy" as "[a nominee's] approach to the Constitution, and to the role of the Supreme
Court in discerning and enforcing its commands." Id.
10. See Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 2, at 219 (statement of Sen. Cohen) ("The
additional question that we are seeking to probe is that of your judicial philosophy....
But even that examination of philosophy is not without its limits.... What I think we are
trying to do, and are only really qualified to do, is to examine your philosophy to deter-
mine whether we find it so extreme that it might call into question those other requisites
that I mentioned before [e.g., intelligence, competence, and temperament]."). Senator
Hatch seemed potentially hostile to questions about judicial philosophy early in Ken-
nedy's hearings. He said:
I just want to make a recommendation to you. There are a lot of comments
about how you will have to go into philosophy here, and you are going to have
to go into judicial theories, and concepts, and that you can treat them any way
you want to.
Let me just say this: I think we, as a committee, have to refrain from delving
into your personal views with regard to constitutional doctrine.
Kennedy Hearings, supra note 7, at 41. However, Hatch later asked questions about
originalism, questions clearly going to the topic of judicial philosophy. See id. at 192
("And so I would ask you, in your opinion, whose intent does govern, or whose meaning
does govern?"); id. at 193 ("Let me just say the cases may evolve, circumstances may
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many others have emphasized the legitimacy of the topic." In
general, however, questions about interpretive methods such as
the role of precedent or legislative history do not provoke ex-
plicit reactions of impropriety. 2 So while Senate confirmation
hearings have numerous purposes, discovering a nominee's judi-
cial philosophy is clearly one of them.'" But this raises a basic
question: Do the exchanges between the nominees and the Sena-
tors actually reveal anything useful about a nominee's judicial
philosophy?
Despite the importance of this question, surprisingly little
work has been done comparing the statements made by nomi-
nees at their confirmation hearings with their subsequent behav-
ior on the Supreme Court. If the hearings reveal substantively
valuable information about nominees' views, then we would ex-
pect to find a relationship between the Justices' statements and
their judicial decisions. This Article is an initial look at that rela-
tionship. Specifically, we examine statements involving the
nominees' views on stare decisis, originalism and legislative his-
tory, and also statements involving their views on the rights of
criminal defendants. We then rank order the nominees' confir-
mation hearings statements on these issues, and evaluate
whether the rankings correlate with the Justices' voting patterns
or, in the case of legislative history, the content of their opinions.
Given the focus of this Symposium-Empirical and Mathemati-
cal Inquiries of the Rehnquist Court-we focus on the Rehnquist
change, doctrines may change, applications of the Constitution may evolve, but the Con-
stitution itself does not evolve unless the people actually amend it. Do you agree with
that?").
11. See, e.g., Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 2, at 114 (statement of Sen. Biden) ("I
have said many times and I want you to know that I believe my duty obliges me to learn
how nominees will decide, not what they will decide, but how they will decide. This obli-
gation for Senators to inquire into and understand the judicial philosophies of a Supreme
Court nominee is neither new nor disputed any longer .. " ) (emphasis added); Ken-
nedy Hearings, supra note 7, at 71 (statement of Sen. Heflin) ("Judge Kennedy, in these
hearings you will be questioned on your views of the Constitution, your judicial philoso-
phy, your commitment to equal justice under law.").
12. See, e.g., Kennedy Hearings, supra note 7, at 141 (statement of Judge Kennedy)
("Well, I do not wish to resist your line of questioning [about original intent], because I
think it is very important; it goes to the judicial method.").
13. See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 4, at 96. One purpose not mentioned thus far
is Senator DeConcini's concern that a nominee is a "listener." See The Nomination of
David H. Sower to Be Associate Justice of the Suprenme Court of the United States: Hear-
ings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 133 (1990) [hereinafter Sourer
Hearings] (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("I want to say, Judge, you have said many im-
pressive things today; many of them have left a very favorable impression with me. Most
important to me is that you are very convincing, that you are a listener; nothing is more
important in communication than to listen.").
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Natural Court (the period from 1994 to 2005 when the same nine
Justices served together). 4 This focus allows for consistent com-
parison of voting and decisionmaking patterns among the nine
Justices.
Part II of this Article provides a description and historical
account of the Rehnquist Natural Court and its Justices- Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Part H1 also exam-
ines the various purposes other than revealing judicial philoso-
phies that the confirmation hearings may serve. Part III
describes our quantitative dataset, methodology and results, in-
cluding our use of blind surveys to rank confirmation hearing
statements. Since we know of no other study that attempts to
measure confirmation hearing statements, we hope this sympo-
sium piece facilitates further discussion on how one might best
evaluate confirmation hearing statements, and, thus, how we
might improve upon our preliminary methodology (e.g., improv-
ing the survey instrument, including other areas of law, changing
the population of the survey participants, or finding other ways
besides surveys to operationalize confirmation hearing state-
ments). Part IV explains and uses a different methodology. This
Part compares confirmation hearing statements about the role of
legislative history with the percentage of authored cases invok-
ing legislative history. Part V discusses our conclusions and pre-
sents suggestions for additional research.
II. THE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS AND THE
REHNQUIST NATURAL COURT
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist presided over the
U.S. Supreme Court longer than any other Chief Justice in the
twentieth century." His Court at various times included Justices
as different from each other as William Brennan, Thurgood
Marshall, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
Thomas. From 1994 to 2005, however, the same nine Justices-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia,
14. A "natural Court" is a period of time during which the membership of the
Court remains stable. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 313 (1st ed. 1994).
15. Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure over the Court was in fact the fourth longest in
history: John Marshall presided over the Court for 34 years (1801 to 1835); Roger
Taney's term lasted 28 years (1836 to 1864); Melville Fuller's term extended 22 years
(1888-1910); and Justice Rehnquist's lasted 19 years (1986 to 2005). See RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES lvii (6th ed. 2000).
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Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer-sat together.
This extraordinary period-eleven terms without any change of
personnel-constituted the second longest natural court period
in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court.'"
These nine Justices were nominated by five different presi-
dents over the span of 23 years.'7 Control of the Senate over the
course of these nominations also changed: Democrats controlled
the Senate during seven of the nominations (Stevens, Thomas,
Souter, Kennedy, Rehnquist (1971), Breyer, and Ginsburg),
while Republicans had that honor during three (Scalia,
O'Connor, and Rehnquist (1986)).'8 And of course, Robert
Bork's failed confirmation hearings-widely considered a semi-
nal event in the recent history of the confirmation process-
occurred in 1987, after the Rehnquist, O'Connor and Scalia
hearings, but before the hearings of the remaining Justices.'9
16. The longest natural Court was presided over by Justice John Marshall. That
Court lasted twelve years, from 1812 to 1824. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 304.
17. President Nixon first nominated Justice Rehnquist; President Ford nominated
Justice Stevens; President Reagan nominated Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy,
and also elevated Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice; President George H.W. Bush nomi-
nated Justices Souter and Thomas; and President Clinton nominated Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer. Id. at 289.
18. GEORGE L. WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS
OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 52 (1995).
19. Contrary to some contemporary assumptions, Robert Bork was not the first
nominee rejected or vigorously disputed on ideological grounds. Approximately 20% of
Supreme Court nominations fail. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 173. Many of
these fail for overtly political reasons: President Washington's effort to elevate Justice
John Rutledge to Chief Justice failed because of Justice Rutledge's outspoken opposition
to the Jay Treaty. See James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Su-
prene Court Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 337 (1989). President Jackson's
nomination of Roger Taney, while ultimately successful, faced stiff opposition because of
a dispute between President Jackson and the Senate regarding reauthorization of a na-
tional bank. See A Great Judicial Character, Roger Brooke Taney, 18 YALE L.J. 10, 16-17
(1908). President Wilson's nomination of Louis Brandeis in 1916 was almost derailed by
the American Bar Association's opposition to his sociological style of jurisprudence
(magnified by its anti-Semitism). See generally John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis
D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965). John Parker's nomination was rejected in 1930
because of the opposition of organized labor and the NAACP. See Richard L. Watson,
Jr., The Defeat of Judge Parker: A Study in Pressure Groups and Politics, 50(2) MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 213, 213-14 (1963). Two of Richard Nixon's nominees (Clement
Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell) had similar difficulties. See Stephen L. Wasby &
Joel B. Grossman, Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.: New Perspective on His Nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court, 1990 DUKE L.J. 74, 74; Bruce H. Kalk, The Carswell Affilir:
The Politics of a Supreme Court Nomination in the Nixon Administration, 42 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 261, 261 (1998). The widespread assumption that confirmation hearings are
now more "political" than in the past may be attributable to the increase in interest
group participation in the hearings. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Nancy Staudi &
Rend Lindst~dt, The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S.
Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1150 (2005). Thus, it is not clear to some of
the authors that Judge Bork's failed nomination was in fact the watershed event it often
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Not surprisingly given these varied political contexts, the
content of the confirmation hearings for the nine Justices dif-
fered, both in style and substance. Justices O'Connor and Scalia
were confirmed by unanimous votes in a Republican-controlled
Senate.2' Justice Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice and Jus-
tice Thomas's hearing, in contrast, were vigorously contested
and each of these Justices won Senate approval by relatively nar-
row margins.2' The nominations of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
initiated by a Democratic president and confirmed by a Democ-
ratic Senate, were much less contentious. 2 The issue areas fo-
cused on during the confirmation hearings also varied a great
deal. For example, questions about abortion were more promi-
nent in the later hearings than in the earlier ones, while ques-
tions about the use of legislative intent in statutory interpreta-
tion increased dramatically after Justice Scalia's confirmation.
Despite the rich research possibilities created by these hear-
ings, there is little scholarship examining the substantive content
of them. 23 Much of the existing literature uses empirical analysis
to examine the role of the Senate in the confirmation process,
but does not attempt to analyze and compare the nominees' sub-
stantive statements at their hearings, much less compare those
statements themselves to the nominees' subsequent voting re-
cords once on the Court. The legal literature likewise has ne-
glected this area. Although there is an abundance of law review
articles discussing the confirmation process and the Senate's role
is portrayed as.
20. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 290; see also Charles M. Cameron, Albert D.
Cover & Jeffrey Segal, Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional
Model, 84 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 525 (1990).
21. Justice Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice by a Senate vote of 65 to 33.
Justice Thomas was confirmed by a Senate vote of only 52 to 48. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 14, at 290.
22. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are widely believed to have been "consensus
nominations," meaning that President Clinton solicited input from Republican Senate
leaders (particularly Sen. Orrin Hatch) before naming his choices. See Janet Malcolm,
The Art of Testifying: The Confirmation Hearings as Theatre, THE NEW YORKER, Mar.
13, 2006, at 70.
23. Several books have been published in the past few years examining the nomina-
tion and confirmation process. These books include: RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING
JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS (2005); 3 FEDERAL
ABORTION POLITICS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS (Neal
Devins & Wendy L. Watson eds., 1995); LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS (4th ed. 2007); EPSTEIN &
SEGAL, supra note 4; DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER
JUDICIAL NOMINATION STATISTICS: U.S. DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS, 1977-2002
(2004).
2007]
134 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:127
in it, we are aware of none that attempt to connect confirmation
hearing statements to subsequent judicial behavior.24
This Article is a first step in remedying that oversight. We
are aware, of course, that there is much going on at the Justices'
confirmation hearings that does not involve sincere efforts by
Senators to gain information about the sincere preferences of
nominees. We assume, for example, that Senators are (among
other things) satisfying interest groups by voicing their con-
cerns, s signaling policy preferences to the Court as a whole,26
and strengthening or weakening other Senators commitment to
the nominee.27 And the nominee, of course, is attempting to get
confirmed. Nonetheless, one goal of the hearings clearly is to
generate information about how a nominee will answer constitu-
tional questions if confirmed." We believe it is worthwhile to ex-
amine the extent to which this goal is being met.
III. SURVEY-BASED ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
A. DATA & METHODOLOGY
We reviewed the complete printed transcripts of the Senate
confirmation hearings for the nine members of the Rehnquist
Natural Court." We included Justice Rehnquist's hearings for
24. This rich literature includes Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Examining the Judicial
Nomination Process: The Politics of Advice and Consent, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1992); Mi-
chael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory anti the Future of the Federal Appointments Process, 50
DUKE L.J. 1687 ( 2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of
the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467 (1998); Michael J.
Gerhardt, Putting Presidential Performance in the Federal Appointments Process in Per-
spective, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Richard D. Manoloff, The Advice and
Consent of the Congress: Toward-a Supreme Court Appointment Process for Our Time,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087 (1993); William G. Ross, The Senate's Constitutional Role in Con-
firming Cabinet Nominees and Other Executive Officers, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1123
(1998); and Gerald Walpin, Take Obstructionism Out of the Judicial Nominations Con-
firmation Process, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 89 (2003).
25. See Mary Sherris, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission: Maintaining What Remains of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Through Constitutional Compromise, 30 AKRON L. REV. 561, 561 (1997).
26. See Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1337, 1338 (2006).
27. Margaret Williams & Lawrence Baum, Questioning Jludges About Their Deci-
sions: Supreme Court Nominees Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90(2)
JUDICATURE 73, 74-75 (2006).
28. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 9 and 12; see also Williams & Baum, supra
note 27, at 75.
29. Transcripts of Nomination Hearings for Supreme Court Justices are available at
the following web address: http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/one-item-and_
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
both his Associate Justice and Chief Justice nominations. After
reviewing the transcripts of the hearings, we extracted all the
statements related to the nominees' commitment to stare decisis,
commitment to originalism, and commitment to the protection
of the rights of criminal defendants. With the help of student
volunteers, we then set out to rank order the nominees in terms
of their commitment to these three items. We were not only in-
terested in the rank order of the Justices (e.g., who made state-
ments indicating a preference for originalism, who objected to
originalism, and who fell in between), but also in the spatial dis-
tances of their ordering (e.g., while Justices may dislike the ex-
clusionary rule to varying disagrees, those that object to it out-
right are closer in space to each other than those who wish to see
the doctrine modified).
In order to achieve these ordinal and spatial rankings, we
took the statements extracted from the transcripts and created
three packets of quotations, one each for stare decisis, original-
ism, and the rights of criminal defendants. Each packet con-
tained one page of quotations per justice. In some instances, the
quantity of relevant text for a Justice exceeded our limit of one
page. As we did not want to overwhelm the students with text
and risk that they would not read the quotations carefully, we
removed repetitive or extraneous material. Just as the initial
process of identifying relevant statements in the transcripts in-
volved some subjective judgments, so too did this process of par-
ing down the statements to a single page of quotations. Unless
we were to ask the students to read the entire transcript for each
Justice, which clearly was not feasible, the subjective nature of
this process was unavoidable. The consolidated quotations for
each packet are fully disclosed in Appendix A.
We distributed these packets of quotations to 119 second
and third year law students. Each student received one packet.
For reasons of cost and convenience, students are often used as
stand-ins for the general population, especially in experimental
research."' For our purposes, however, law students offered ex-
teasers/Supreme-CourtNominationHearings.htm.
30. See, e.g, Greg Pogarksy & Linda Babcock, Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring,
and Bargaining Impasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUDIES, 143, 150 (2001) (using a convenience
sample of 462 undergraduate and graduate students from the "University of Arizona's
business college, the MBA program at the University of Chicago, and the Harvard Busi-
ness School subject pool (consisting of undergraduates in the Boston area)"); Michael E.
Morrell, Citizens' Evaluations of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory
Meets Empirical Science, 52 POL. RES. 0. 293, 303 (1999) (using a convenience sample of
"undergraduates enrolled at a major southwestern university"); Thomas E. Nelson, Zoe
20071
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pertise that the general population lacks. Nevertheless, consid-
erations of cost and convenience played a role here too. Law
professors or experienced appellate practitioners, for example,
would offer even greater expertise, but students are more acces-
sible.
Students were not told the source of the quotations or even
that they came from the nine Justices on the Rehnquist Natural
Court. Instead, the instruction sheet handed out with the packet
stated as follows: "The United States Senate has held dozens of
confirmation hearings for potential Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. Attached are quotations from the confirmation
hearings of nine of those nominees."' By not telling the students
the sources of the quotes, pre-existing conceptions of individual
Justices should not have affected the students' responses. In-
deed, one of the primary reasons for asking to students to evalu-
ate the statements rather than evaluating the statements our-
selves was to avoid the potential effects of being familiar with
the nominees' later behavior.
Students were asked to read the quotations contained on
the sheets attached to the instructions and do one of following,
depending on which topic area that they were randomly as-
signed:
(1) Rank each nominee's relative commitment to stare de-
cisis.
(2) Rank each nominee's relative commitment to using
originalism as a method of constitutional interpreta-
tion. A commitment to "originalism" as a method of in-
terpretation should be understood for these purposes
as a Justice's commitment to interpreting the Constitu-
tion as it was understood by the Framers and/or the
public at the time of its enactment.
(3) Rank each nominee's relative commitment to protect-
ing the rights or interests of criminal defendants.
M. Oxley, & Rosalee A. Clawson, Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects, 19 POL.
BEHAV. 221, 229 (1997) (using a convenience sample of 116 undergraduates enrolled in
political science courses); Ellen D. B. Riggle & Mitzi M. S. Johnson, Age Difference in
Political Decision Making: Strategies for Evaluating Political Candidates, 18 POL. BEHAV.
99, 104 (1996) (using a convenience sample of 40 young adults enrolled in undergraduate
political science courses and 40 older adults from a volunteer subject pool).
31. The instruction sheet for each packet is available and on file with authors.
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Students ordered the Justices (i.e., each sheet) from 1 to 9,
with 1 representing the Justice showing the least commitment to
stare decisis, originalism, or the rights of criminal defendants,
and with 9 representing the greatest commitment. No two Jus-
tices could receive the same number.32 The students' rankings
yielded an average score for each Justice somewhere between 1
and 9 (generated by calculating the sum of student rankings for a
given Justice, divided by the number of students ranking that is-
sue area). These average scores, found below in Tables A, D,
and G, provide a measure of the relative commitment of each
Justice to the three issue areas as stated in their confirmation
hearings.
Having thus developed a relative ranking of the Justices'
levels of commitment based on their confirmation hearing
statements, we next needed something to compare those com-
mitment levels to. We opted to compare the commitment rank-
ings to the Justices' individual votes as derived from political sci-
entist Harold Spaeth's Supreme Court Database, as modified for
one co-author's prior projects." We rely on voting data from the
1994-2004 Terms (the Rehnquist Natural Court period). These
data allow us to count the Justices' individual votes to overturn
existing precedent (to compare to the stare decisis commitment
rankings), to track the ideological direction of the Justices' votes
in criminal cases (to compare to the rights of criminal defen-
dants' commitment rankings), and to calculate agreement rates
between Justices in constitutional cases (to compare to the
originalism commitment rankings)." Each of these comparisons
is discussed in turn below.
B. STARE DECISIS
As stated in the Introduction, if confirmation hearings re-
veal substantively valuable information about the nominees' ju-
dicial philosophies, then (assuming the nominees' views remain
constant) one should expect a strong correlation between the
Justices' relative commitments to particular interpretive ap-
32. Most students took between 35 and 45 minutes to complete the exercise.
33. A list of changes made to the publicly available Spaeth Database is available at
http://www.uky.edu/Law/faculty/ringhand/ChangestoDataset.doc.
34. We considered measuring the Justices' commitment to protecting the rights of
criminal defendants by looking at the ideological direction of each Justice's votes in
criminal cases across the entire span of the Justice's career. We opted against this, how-
ever, because Spaeth's directional coding is relative, meaning that a Justice's vote will be
liberal or conservative only in relation to the other possible outcome in the case as pre-
sented.
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proaches and their judicial behavior on the bench. We evaluate
this possibility here in relation to the nominees' views on stare
decisis. Justices whose confirmation hearing statements ranked
them as the most committed to stare decisis should vote to in-
validate relatively fewer existing precedents than those Justices
whose statements ranked them as less committed.
The Justices' relative commitments to stare decisis, as de-
termined by the student rankings of their confirmation hearing
statements, is shown in Table A below. As illustrated, Justice
Rehnquist showed the least commitment to precedent, obtaining
an average student ranking of only 2.949. Justices Ginsburg and
Scalia showed the greatest commitment, with each of these Jus-
tices achieving a 5.564 average. The differences between the
nominees are not sharp, however. All but one of the nominees
are located within the middle third of the range, i.e., from 4.0 to
6.0.
Table A: Justice Rankings Based on Confirmation Hearing
Statements: Commitment to Stare Decisis/Precedent
Std.
Justices Average Score Dev. Min. Max.
Rehnquist 2.949 2.127 1 9
Souter 4.333 2.579 1 9
Stevens 4.436 2.280 1 9
O'Connor 4.564 2.349 1 9
Thomas 5.026 2.211 1 9
Kennedy 5.026 2.631 1 9
Breyer 5.026 1.899 1 9
Scalia 5.564 2.654 1 9
Ginsburg 5.564 2.162 1 9
Scale = 1 to 9 where 9 equals greatest commitment. N = 39.
If confirmation hearing statements provide useful informa-
tion about future judicial behavior, we would expect based on
these rankings that Justice Rehnquist would vote to invalidate
the most precedents, while Justice Scalia and Ginsburg would
vote to invalidate the fewest. An examination of the Justices'
votes to overturn precedent shows that this is only partially
borne out. Using the modified Spaeth database, we counted the
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Justices' votes to overturn precedent in cases decided in the 1994
through 2000 Terms in which all nine Justices participated. 5 A
Justice's vote is counted as a vote to alter precedent if the Justice
writes or joins an opinion specifically stating that an earlier case
is being or should be "overruled," as well as decisions stating
that past precedent should be "disapproved" or is "no longer
good law."'', Decisions in which an opinion distinguishes an exist-
ing precedent from the case at bar are not counted.37
Table B reports the results based on the Spaeth data. Of the
535 cases decided from 1994 to 2000 by all nine Justices, Justice
Thomas cast the most votes to invalidate precedent (4.3% of the
cases) and Justice Souter cast the least (1.3% of the cases).
Based on only the percentage of votes to overturn precedent and
without regard to the importance of any particular vote, Thomas
appears to be the Justice least committed to precedent. This re-
sult seems plausible, based on the substance of his votes. Thomas
has, for example, suggested reconsideration of well-established
precedents such as Calder v. Bull (1798)" and Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co. (1921).' He also has suggested reconsider-
ing the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence to a greater ex-
tent than the other Justices in the majority in United States v.
Lopez,"' though in Lopez he conceded that stare decisis might
prevent a return to the original understanding (as he sees it) of
the Commerce Clause." Interestingly, the five "conservative"
members of the Rehnquist Natural Court occupy the five highest
slots in terms of altering precedent, supporting earlier findings
that the Rehnquist Court was an "activist" court in that it ag-
gressively used its power to invalidate existing precedents." The
35. This time frame obviously does not include the entire Rehnquist Natural Court
period, but it is the only time frame for which reliable data were available.
36. See Sara C. Benesh & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court Justice-Centered
Judicial Databases: The Warren, Burger and Rehnquist Courts (1953-2000 Terms) 31
(March 2003) (prepared for the S. Sidney Ulmer Project for Research in Law and Judi-
cial Politics, University of Kentucky), http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/
flpdcodebk.pdf.
37. Id.
38. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538-39 (1998) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
39. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320-
22 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Compare 514 U.S. 549, 549-68 (1995) (majority opinion), with id. at 584-603
(Thomas, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 601 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although I might be willing to return
to the original understanding, I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day
to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare
decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.").
42. The "conservative" Justices on the Rehnquist Natural Court voted to overturn
2007]
140 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:127
four "moderate/liberal" Justices, on the other hand, each voted
to alter precedent less than two percent of the time.4
Table B: Votes to Alter Precedent: 1994 through 2000 Terms
Whether Justice
Voted to
Alter Precedent
No Yes Total % Altered
Thomas 512 23 535 4.3%
Scalia 516 19 535 3.6%
Kennedy 519 16 535 3.0%
Rehnquist 523 12 535 2.2%
O'Connor 523 12 535 2.2%
Breyer 525 10 535 1.9%
Stevens 526 9 535 1.7%
Ginsburg 527 8 535 1.5%
Souter 528 7 535 1.3%
Total 4699 116 4815 2.4%
Note: Includes only cases in which all nine Justices participated.
As shown in Table C below, only Justices O'Connor, Breyer
and Ginsburg placed near where their confirmation hearing
statements indicated they would. Justice Rehnquist, whose con-
firmation hearing statements showed a notably low commitment
to precedent relative to his fellow Justices, was in the middle of
the pack in actual practice. Justices Scalia and Thomas, as noted
above, were far from their presumptive positions.
more precedents and to invalidate more federal statutes than did their more "liberal"
colleagues. See Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24
CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Spring 2007). Since "conservatives" control the major-
ity of the Court, they may seek to grant cert. to cases where they seek to reverse more
liberal precedent. Given that these more conservative Justices can control the docket,
they are free to vote in accordance with their views of stare decists as stated in their con-
firmation hearings. However, the "liberals," to the extent they fear a conservative Court
decision, may not wish to grant cert. in cases they otherwise would prefer hearing in or-
der to reverse Court precedent.
43. /d.
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Table C: Comparison of Rankings versus Actual Votes to
Overturn Precedent
Least Survey Ranking % Altered
Committed Precedent
to Precedent
1 Rehnquist (2.949) Thomas (4.3%)
2 Souter (4.333) Scalia (3.6%)
3 Stevens (4.436) Kennedy (3.0%)
4 O'Connor (4.564) O'Connor (2.2%)
5 Thomas (5.026) Rehnquist (2.2%)
6 Kennedy (5.026) Breyer (1.9%)
7 Breyer (5.026) Stevens (1.7%)
8 Scalia (5.564) Ginsburg (1.5%)
9 Ginsburg (5.564) Souter (1.3%)
Most
Committed
The overall correlation between the Justices' commitments
to stare decisis as measured by their confirmation hearing rank-
ings and the actual number of votes cast to overturn precedent is
weak: 0.289. Confirmation hearing statements about a nominee's
purported commitment to stare decisis appear to reveal very lit-
tle about how most nominees will vote once on the bench.
C. ORIGINALISM
Most members of the Rehnquist Natural Court spoke at
length at their confirmation hearings about originalism as an in-
terpretive method, though Justice Stevens discussed the issue
much less than his colleagues. While all of the Justices hedged
their comments a bit, there was interesting variety in their state-
ments. Justice Thomas, for example, offered the ambivalent
statement that "[o]ur notions of what [the liberty clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment] means evolves with the country, it
moves with our history and our tradition., 44 Justice Ginsburg of-
44. The Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. at
274 (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings].
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fered up a somewhat confusing weather analogy: "[Wihat a judge
should take account of is not the weather of the day, but the cli-
mate of an era. The climate of the age, yes, but not the weather of
the day, not what the newspaper is reporting. ' '41 Justice O'Connor
made perhaps the strongest pro-originalism statement, saying:
I do not believe that it is the function of the judiciary to step in
and change the law because the times have changed or the so-
cial mores have changed, and ... I believe that on occasion the
Court has reached changed results interpreting a given provi-
sion of the Constitution based on its research of what the true
meaning of that provision is-based on the intent of the fram-
46
ers, its research on the history of that particular provision.
Based on these and other statements, the students ranked
the Justices' relative commitments to originalism as an interpre-
tive method. 7 As shown in Table D, Justice Ginsburg ranked as
the Justice least committed to originalism, with an average rank-
ing of only 2.447. Justice O'Connor showed the greatest per-
ceived commitment, with an average ranking of 6.947.
Table D: Justice Rankings Based on Confirmation Hearing
Statements: Commitment to Originalism
Justices Average Score Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Ginsburg 2.447 1.606 1 7
Souter 4.211 2.506 1 9
Kennedy 4.237 2.696 1 9
Stevens 5.079 2.019 1 9
Rehnquist 5.158 2.736 1 9
Thomas 5.395 2.087 1 9
Scalia 5.684 2.157 1 9
Breyer 5.842 2.319 2 9
O'Connor 6.947 2.514 1 9
Scale = 1 to 9 where 9 equals greatest commitment. N -- 38.
45. Ginsberg Hearings, supra note 2, at 303.
46. O'Connor Hearings, supra note 5, at 67,
47. The students were provided with the following definition of originalism: "A
commitment to 'originalism' as a method of interpretation should be understood for
these purposes as a Justice's commitment to interpreting the Constitution as it was un-
derstood by the Framer's and/or the public at the time of its enactment."
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Measuring a Justice's commitment to originalism, or any
other judicial philosophy, is quite difficult, since what counts as
an originalist outcome is likely to be disputed in many cases."
Here, we consider the extent to which one Justice joined a con-
curring or dissenting opinion written by a second Justice. This
information-agreement with concurrences and dissents ("spe-
cial opinions') written by another Justice-focuses precisely on
whether the agreeing Justices had similar rationales for a deci-
sion. The decision to join a majority opinion does not always tell
us much about whether a Justice agrees in any great depth with
the analysis presented in the opinion; a decision to join a special
opinion is a more finely tuned tool, one that almost certainly in-
dicates agreement not just with the outcome but also with the
reasoning. Justices who agree with each other's reasoning proc-
esses should be more likely to join each other's special opinions.
Of the 278 constitutional cases we examined, the average
agreement rate between all of the Justices in special opinions is
2.3%. As can be seen in the shaded areas in Table E below,
however, certain Justices joined the concurring or dissenting
opinions of their peers at a much greater rate than the average.
Justice Thomas joined the concurring or dissenting opinions
drafted by Justice Scalia 15.5% of the time. Justice Ginsburg
joined the non-majority opinions of Justices Souter and Stevens
at rates of 10.1% and 11.5%, respectively.
48. See generally Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 1.
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Table E: Agreement Rates in Constitutional Cases (1994-2004)
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If the Justices' commitments to originalism as expressed in
their confirmation hearings is manifesting itself in their constitu-
tional opinions, we would expect to see higher agreement rates
in special opinions between Justices with similar originalism
rankings." We would, in other words, expect to see some corre-
lation between the Justices who expressed similar levels of
commitment to originalism as an interpretive method (i.e. closer
ranking scores) and the willingness of those Justices to join the
reasoning in special opinions written by Justices with similar lev-
els of commitment. To test this possibility, we first determined
the differences in the originalism scores for each pair of Justices.
For example, Souter and Kennedy's originalism scores were
relatively close together, while O'Connor and Ginsburg's scores
were relatively far apart. We then looked at how often the Jus-
tices in each pair signed on to one another's special opinions.
The smaller the difference between two Justices' originalism
scores, the more often they should join each other's special opin-
ions. Table F contains the results.
49. We do not mean to imply that originalism can in fact answer all (some of the
authors would add "or most") constitutional questions; it plainly cannot. See Robert M.
Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 113
(2002). We assert only that Justices claiming an adherence to originalist methods should
agree with the reasoning of other Justices claiming an adherence to such methods.
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Table F: Comparison of Ranking Score Difference versus
Number of Concurring or Dissenting Opinions of Other Justice
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As shown above, Justices Souter and Kennedy had the closest
originalism rankings, yet joined each other's concurring or dis-
senting opinions only six times. By contrast, some Justice pairs
with wide originalism score gaps agreed with each other fre-
quently (e.g., Ginsburg-Breyer; Stevens-Ginsburg). It turns out
that these originalism scores do not correlate with agreement
rates between Justices.
D. THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
The last issue area we tested using the student ranking was
the commitment of the Justices to protecting the rights of crimi-
nal defendants. Unlike originalism and stare decisis, this part of
the project tested the Justices' views about a particular area of
law, rather than their purported commitment to an interpretive
approach or methodology. We were interested in whether this
type of questioning-questions about particular issue areas
rather than judicial philosophy-provided useful information
about future judicial behavior. As in our discussion of stare de-
cisis above, we tested whether Justices whose confirmation hear-
ing statements expressed a strong preference for protecting the
rights of criminal defendants (e.g., indicated support for
Miranda, the exclusionary rule, or similar protections) were in
fact more likely to vote to protect criminal defendants in crimi-
nal cases.
The ranking of the Justices' relative commitments to the
protection of criminal defendants (based again on their confir-
mation hearing quotes) is shown in Table G below. As illus-
trated, Justice O'Connor showed the least commitment to the
rights of criminal defendants, with an average score of only
2.474. Justice Ginsburg, in contrast, showed the greatest com-
mitment, with an average score of 7.816.
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Table G: Justice Rankings Based on Confirmation Hearing
Statements: Commitment to Protecting the Rights of
Criminal Defendants
Justices Average Score Std. Dev. Min. Max.
O'Connor 2.474 1.983 1 8
Rehnquist 3.553 2.368 1 9
Kennedy 3.579 1.926 1 9
Breyer 4.395 1.980 1 8
Scalia 4.474 1.899 1 9
Souter 5.079 1.937 1 9
Thomas 6.684 1.919 1 9
Stevens 6.947 1.916 1 9
Ginsburg 7.816 1.829 2 9
Scale = 1 to 9 where 9 equals greatest commitment. N = 38.
To measure the Justices' relative commitments to protecting
the rights of criminal defendants once on the bench, we again
used information culled from the revised Spaeth Supreme Court
database. The Spaeth data allowed us to identify all of the crimi-
nal law cases decided during the Rehnquist Natural Court period
(the 1994 to 2004 Terms). " It also identifies each Justice's vote in
those cases as "liberal" or "conservative." A "liberal" vote in
this category of cases is one in favor of the criminal defendant; a
"conservative" vote is the opposite.'
Not surprisingly, Justices of the Rehnquist Court commonly
thought of as the most conservative were more likely to vote
conservatively in criminal cases: Justices Thomas, Rehnquist and
Scalia all voted for the conservative outcome in more than 75%
of these cases. Justice Thomas cast the most such votes, voting
conservatively in 78.0% of the 214 criminal cases examined. Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Conner voted for 68.7% and 66.4%, re-
spectively, while each of the "moderate/liberal" Justices voted
conservatively in less than 45.5% of the cases. Justice Stevens
50. "Criminal" cases are those cases which Spaeth codes as value=l. Only those
cases in which all nine Rehnquist Natural Court Justices participated were included.
51. See The Justice-Centered Rehnquist Court Database, 1986-1998 Terms, http://
www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm.
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voted conservatively the least often, doing so in only 27.1% of
the cases.52
Table H: Directional Votes in Criminal Cases (1994-2004)
Justices Conservative % Liberal % Total
Thomas 167 78.0% 47 22.0% 214
Rehnquist 160 76.9% 48 23.1% 208
Scalia 161 75.2% 53 24.8% 214
Kennedy 147 68.7% 67 31.3% 214
O'Connor 142 66.4% 72 33.6% 214
Breyer 97 45.5% 116 54.5% 213
Souter 84 39.3% 130 60.7% 214
Ginsburg 79 36.9% 135 63.1% 214
Stevens 58 27.1% 156 72.9% 214
Total 1095 57.1% 824 42.9% 1919
If confirmation hearing statements are providing useful in-
formation about a Justice's future commitment to protecting the
rights of criminal defendants, we would expect Justices who ex-
pressed the strongest commitment to such rights to cast the most
"liberal" votes in criminal cases. As shown below in Table I,
there is some support for this expectation.
52. Six of Chief Justice Rehnquist's votes in these criminal cases were deemed not
ideological codable by Spaeth, as was one of Justice Breyer's votes. This accounts for the
disparity in the total number of votes cast for these Justices.
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Table I: Comparison of Rankings versus Actual Votes in
Criminal Cases
Least Committed to Survey Ranking %Liberal Vote
Defendant Rights
1 O'Connor (2.474) Thomas (22.0%)
2 Rehnquist (3.553) Rehnquist (23.1%)
3 Kennedy (3.579) Scalia (24.8%)
4 Breyer (4.395) Kennedy (31.3%)
5 Scalia (4.474) O'Connor (33.6%)
6 Souter (5.079) Breyer (54.5%)
7 Thomas (6.684) Souter (60.7%)
8 Stevens (6.947) Ginsburg (63.1%)
9 Ginsburg (7.816) Stevens (72.9%)
Most Committed
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both evidenced the greatest
commitment to the rights of criminal defendants in their confir-
mation hearing statements, and both of these Justices cast the
most votes to protect criminal defendants while on the
Rehnquist Natural Court. Also, seven of the nine Justices fell on
the "correct" (as predicted by their confirmation hearing state-
ments) side of the large gap in liberal voting percentages found
between Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer. Using that gap as
a dividing line between the Justices, only Justices Thomas and
Breyer showed inconsistent voting patterns in these cases (Jus-
tice Breyer voted for more liberal outcomes than anticipated,
while Justice Thomas voted for notably fewer). Overall, the cor-
relation between survey rankings based on confirmation hearing
votes and actual votes to alter precedent is 0.5376. While this is
only a moderate correlation, it is stronger than the correlation
found in our stare decisis analysis and much stronger than the
correlation in the originalism analysis.
IV. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
We also examined the Justices' confirmation hearing state-
ments in an additional area-the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. As before, we extracted the statements
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from the hearings in which the nominees spoke about their views
on legislative history. This time, however, we did not rely on stu-
dent evaluators. Instead, we evaluated the quotations ourselves.
There were several reasons for taking an alternative approach
with this topic. We were primarily concerned that we would not
have enough student participation to include four different sets
of quotations, but there also is some value in taking alternative
approaches to studying this topic. In evaluating the statements
about legislative history, however, we knew the identities of the
speakers. While we were not conscious of any impact from this
knowledge, we cannot rule out the possibility that it influenced
our rankings of the nominees.
Legislative history is one of the most common interpretive
aids available to judges, but judges, like legal scholars, disagree
about its proper use and even whether to use it at all. 3 It is not
self-evident that the differing views on legislative history actually
matter when it comes to deciding real cases, but we proceed on
the assumption that judges' differing views on legislative history
may matter and therefore consider whether the confirmation
hearings provide any insight into the nominees' subsequent use
of legislative history once they are on the Court.
The proper use of legislative history is discussed in seven of
the nine nominees' hearings. There is virtually nothing on this
topic in Stevens' hearings, but there is a ready explanation for
this lack of discussion; The status of legislative history as an in-
terpretative aid has varied over the years. In 1930, Max Radin
claimed that there was "no general agreement" on whether it is
appropriate to use it in statutory interpretation." In the view of
many observers, the legal community later reached a consensus
in favor of legislative history, and Stevens' hearings occurred
during this period of consensus." While O'Connor and
53. See, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264,
283 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The text's the
thing. We should therefore ignore drafting history without discussing it, instead of after
discussing it."); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. United States, 37 F.3d 321, 323-24 (7th
Cir. 1994) (opinion by Posner, J.) ("Legislative history is in bad odor in some influential
judicial quarters, but it continues to be relied on heavily by most Supreme Court Justices
and lower-court judges; and in the case of statutory language as technical and arcane as
that of the DISC provisions, the slogan that Congress votes on the bill and not on the
report strikes us as pretty empty.") (citation omitted); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).
54. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930).
55. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 296 (1982); Archibald
Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HA RV. L. REV. 370, 380
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Rehnquist discussed the topic, they did so only briefly. In the
mid-80s, however, the consensus began to weaken, in large part
because of comments made by Scalia at various law schools in
1985 and 1986.6 And not surprisingly, Scalia spoke at length
about the topic during his hearings. Oddly, there was virtually no
discussion of the topic at Kennedy's hearings, even though they
were only about a year after Scalia's, but setting Stevens and
Kennedy aside, we found substantive comments in the other
nominees' hearings, although Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist
spoke only briefly on the topic.
Of the seven nominees to address the issue, Justice
O'Connor was the most favorably disposed towards the use of
legislative history. She offered no qualifications on its use, such
as a preference for limiting it to situations where the statutory
text is unclear. Instead, she simply included it on the list of useful
aids when interpreting statutes: "[I]t seems to me important in
construing statutes that the Court look at the specific legislative
enactment itself, the language used, and any legislative history
which is available in connection with it, as aids in the proper in-
terpretation. These are crucial factors."" Rehnquist, in contrast
to O'Connor, offered the most common qualification to the use
of legislative history, i.e., that one should look at it only when
the statutory language is not clear.1
It is difficult to draw any rigid distinctions between the com-
ments offered by Justices Thomas, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter,
though if forced to do so, we would likely place them in the pre-
ceding order. All four nominees were generally positive about the
use of legislative history, though each one of them offered some
qualification beyond that stated by Justice Rehnquist. Of the four,
Justice Thomas was perhaps the most positive, insofar as he sug-
gested the least concern about using legislative history. He did ac-
knowledge, however, that "some legislative history is perhaps
more accurate or better than others."" The "point" of statutory
(1947) ("Despite earlier doubts, committee reports, committee amendments, responsible
explanations on the floor, and similar legislative materials may now be considered by a
federal court interpreting a statute, even when the words, taken alone, have an unambi-
guous meaning."); Legislation, 50 HARV. L. REV. 813, 826 (1937) ("A few courts have
forbidden the use of these materials, but the strong approval of a considerable body of
authority now points to their free employability.");
56. See Scalia Hearings, supra note 7, at 74 (statement of Sen. Heflin).
57. O'Connor Hearings, supra note 5, at 134.
58. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 182 (1986) [hereinafter
Rehnquist CJ Hearings].
59. Thomas Hearings, supra note 44, at 213.
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interpretation, according to Justice Thomas, is to discern Con-
gress' intent, and he did not "know how one can go about that
process, the process of interpreting ambiguous statutes, without
looking to legislative history."" Justice Breyer was a bit more cau-
tious. He referenced the potential misuse of legislative history, of-
fering Judge Harold Leventhal's now cliched analogy between us-
ing legislative history and looking for one's friends at a cocktail
party. But Justice Breyer did make clear that he believed that
''an open question in a statute is best understood through the use
of legislative history. 6 2 Thus, both Justices Thomas and Breyer
described legislative history as an essential tool for judges strug-
gling with unclear statutory language. 3
Justices Ginsburg and Souter both endorsed the use of legis-
lative history when the text is unclear, but each of these Justices
also emphasized the reliability of some sources over others.6 4 Jus-
tice Ginsburg said she approached legislative history with "hope-
ful skepticism," 5 and suggested that a unanimous committee re-
port is more reliable than a statement by a single member
(though even on this point she hedged).6 Justice Souter empha-
sized the need to find sources that represent the views of the en-
tire institution. A statement by one member on the floor is
therefore less reliable than other sources. 7 These Justices, then,
clearly emphasized the concern that some materials are much
less likely to reveal the thinking of Congress as a whole. Justices
Thomas and Breyer did not ignore this concern, but they were
somewhat less specific in their discussions of it.
While Justice Scalia offered the most criticism of legislative
history, he was not as hostile to it as might be expected from his
subsequent behavior on the bench, such as his occasional refusal
60. id.
61. The Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.
171 (1994) ("[Judge Leventhal] said, oh, it is like going to a cocktail party and looking
over the crowd and picking out your friends. What he is describing is a misuse of legisla-
tive history.").
62. Id. at 296.
63. This is consistent with the Court's decisions in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) ("If a court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.") and INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,432 n.12 (1987).
64. Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 2, at 224, 326; Souter Hearings, supra note 13, at
131.
65. Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 2, at 224; see also id. at 326.
66. Id. at 224.
67. Souter Hearings, supra 13, at 131.
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to join sections or footnotes of majority opinions that deal with
legislative history." During his hearings, Justice Scalia described
legislative history as "a significant factor in interpreting a stat-
ute," adding that he would use what seemed to him as "reliable
legislative history when it is available to be used"6 9 and that he
would "not exclude it as a basis for [his] decisions as [he had] not
in the past."7 ' In large part, his comments might not be all that
distinguishable from Justices Souter and Ginsburg. In one ex-
change, however, he did go further than those Justices in ex-
pressing his skepticism about legislative history:
Senator Simon.... Do you still believe, if you were writing on
a blank slate, you would call all of legislative history into
question?
Judge Scalia. Yes. If I could create the world anew, I suppose
I still would, but I will no more be able to create the world
anew when I am sitting on the Supreme Court than I could
when I was sitting on the court of appeals, if I ever get to sit
up there."
7
1
Largely because of this statement, we opted to rank Justice Scalia
as the nominee most hostile to the use of legislative history, at
least among the seven Justices who commented on the topic.
Thus, while the Justices' views of the use of legislative his-
tory in statutory cases cannot be ordered decisively, the Justices'
confirmation statement can be meaningfully used to divide the
Justices into four groups. These groups distribute the Justices in
descending order, with the Justices most favorably disposed to
the use of legislative history in Group One and those most skep-
tical of such use placed in Group Four. Justice O'Connor is in
the first group since she offered no qualifications on the use of
legislative history, suggesting that legislative history is always a
welcome part of any effort at statutory interpretation. Justice
Rehnquist is in the second group, because he offered only the
most common qualification on such use-that legislative history
be used only when the language of the statute is not clear. Jus-
68. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843, 1846
(2006); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 113
(2004); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 420 (2003); Associates Com-
mercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955 (1997); United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fab-
ricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 215 (1996).
69. Scalia Hearings, supra note 7, at 65.
70. 11l. at 66.
71. /d. at 105-06.
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tices Thomas, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter comprise the third
group due to their higher degree of skepticism about particular
forms of legislative history; and finally Justice Scalia is in the
fourth group for what appears to be only a grudging acceptance
of legislative history in some situations. It is worth noting again,
however, that Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist did not speak at
length on this topic. If the Senators had been more persistent at
the hearings, these groupings may have been different.
Do the confirmation hearing statements, so grouped, match
up with the nominees' subsequent performance on the Court?
There are two relevant sources of systematic information on the
use of legislative history on the Supreme Court from which to
draw our comparison data: Michael H. Koby's The Supreme
Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of
Justice Scalia's Critique," and James J. Brudney and Corey Dit-
slear's The Decline and Fall of Legislative History.73 Koby's study
provides a count of legislative history references from 1980 to
1998."4 Included in Koby's definition of legislative history are
committee reports, congressional debates, committee hearings,
and the text of bills." Although Koby is a bit thin on his meth-
odological details, his counts appear to include both positive and
negative references to legislative history in majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions.
7
Table J presents Koby's results for the nine Justices of the
Rehnquist Natural Court. Setting aside Justices Stevens and
Kennedy, Justice O'Connor was the most frequent user of legis-
lative history, which is consistent with our examination of the
confirmation hearing testimony. Justice Scalia used legislative
history the least, which also matches up with the confirmation
hearing testimony. Justice Rehnquist's position, however, is not
consistent. One explanation is that Justice Rehnquist changed
his view of legislative history over time. The last four years rep-
resented in Koby's data, 1995 to 1998, are the four years in which
72. Michael H. Koby, The Suprerme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative His-
tory: The Impact of.lustice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999).
73. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative His-
tory? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89
JUDICATURE 220 (2006).
74. Koby, supra note 72, at 373. Koby replicates another study that is also thin on
methodological details. See Carro & Brann, supra note 55, at 298 (describing the meth-
odology for identifying cases as relying on LEXIS searches but without providing the
search terms).
75. Koby, supra note 72, at 373.
76. See id. at 392.
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Justice Rehnquist used legislative history the least often. Thus,
the hearings may have accurately indicated Justice Rehnquist's
views at the time despite the fact that he changed his mind in his
later years on the Court. Justice Thomas' results are perhaps the
most striking. On average, Justice Thomas used legislative his-
tory in 17% of his opinions, putting him closer to Justice Scalia
(9.3%) than Justices Breyer (34.4%), Ginsburg (32%), and
Souter (39%). Thus, Justice Thomas' confirmation hearing
comments were the least revealing of his actual performance on
the bench, as his comments during the hearings suggested he
would be at least as favorably disposed towards legislative his-
tory as those Justices.
Table K provides a measure of the Justices' use of legisla-
tive history based on Brudney and Ditslear's data on decisions
from 1969 to 2005 involving the "law of the workplace." Their
dataset includes 649 majority opinions on issues like union-
management relations, employment discrimination, and related
subjects. Unlike Koby, Brudney and Ditslear excluded from
their tally any opinions in which the reference to legislative his-
tory was actually a rejection of its value. Their data thus repre-
sent a smaller universe of cases, but the data are a more accurate
assessment of the positive role of legislative history, at least in
these "law of the workplace" cases. Based on this methodology,
the predictive value of the Justices' confirmation hearing state-
ments appears low. With these data, Justice O'Connor now
ranks fourth rather than second in terms of using legislative his-
tory. Based on their confirmation hearing statements, one would
expect O'Connor to rely on legislative history more than Justices
Souter and Ginsburg. Justice Rehnquist is again closer to the
bottom than the top. As should be expected from his confirma-
tion hearing statements, Justice Scalia's use of legislative history
is quite low, though Justice Thomas' use is even lower. In this re-
spect, Thomas' position again does not match up with expecta-
tions based on his testimony, though it remains possible that he
changed his views after being confirmed. In sum, the hearings
were a mixed bag for the Senators in terms of figuring out how
the nominees compared to one another.
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Table K: Justices' Reliance on Legislative History
(Brudney & Ditslear)
Justice 1969-2005
Souter 44%
Stevens 40%
Ginsburg 36%
O'Connor 31%
Breyer 29%
Rehnquist 26%
Kennedy 23%
Scalia 4%
Thomas 0%
Note: Only majority opinions involving the "law of the work-
place" are included. Source: Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R.
Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 Jurimetrics J. 292, 298
(1981-1982).
CONCLUSIONS
As noted in the Introduction, Senator Leahy described the
inquiry into a nominee's judicial philosophy as the most impor-
tant issue of the hearings." One would therefore hope the hear-
ings generate accurate information about the nominees that
could actually inform a Senator's vote. While admittedly pre-
liminary, our results indicate that the confirmation hearings are
providing very little substantive information as to future judicial
behavior. Based on the student evaluations, Senators should
perhaps focus their questions on specific issue areas rather than
'big picture' issues involving interpretative methods-or at least
expect to learn more from these questions. Our limited data
support this recommendation in that the nominees' rankings in-
volving criminal defendants are more consistent with the nomi-
nees' subsequent behavior than the rankings involving stare de-
cisis and originalism. Based on our own evaluation of the
statements involving legislative history, we did find some predic-
tive value in the answers provided by the nominees; however, it's
not clear if the Justices' views on legislative history have system-
77. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 7, at 59 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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atic effects on case outcomes. These findings are interesting, in-
sofar as they offer little support for the common senatorial prac-
tice (or desire) of trying to predict judicial behavior by asking
questions about judicial philosophy or interpretive methodol-
78
ogy.
Any recommendation about questions, however, must be
qualified. Our survey results are by no means definitive. The
student rankings, in all three areas, show a high degree of varia-
tion. In all but five situations, each Justice received the full range
of possible ranks in each issue area. Moreover, the standard de-
viations in the Justices' rankings were relatively high, particu-
larly with regard to stare decisis and originalism. This variation
may support a recommendation that Senators wanting real in-
formation should focus on issue areas rather than interpretive
methods: questions about interpretive methods (or interpretive
methods themselves) may be so malleable that very little mean-
ingful information will be conveyed in response to such ques-
tions. There are, however, other possible reasons for the varia-
tions. It is possible, for example, that the full scope of
information conveyed at a confirmation hearing cannot be cap-
tured by looking solely at a nominee's responses to questions.
Context matters. It may be that in stripping the identities of the
nominees and the nature of the questions asked (and of the
questioner) we stripped away too much critical contextual in-
formation, thereby making it impossible for our survey partici-
pants to make meaningful distinctions between the Justices'
statements, even though such distinctions may have been possi-
ble if more information were provided.
Alternatively, our student rankers may not have been up to
the task presented to them. We assumed second and third year
law students could act as a reasonably good proxy for an inter-
ested and reasonably informed but non-expert public (the audi-
ence of constituents that the Senators themselves presumably
care about). This assumption may not be correct. Moreover, le-
gal elites, public opinion leaders, and the Senators themselves
may see different things in the same statements than could our
student evaluators. If this is the case, it is possible that the con-
firmation hearing statements are in fact providing meaningful in-
78. On the other hand, Senator Simpson actually noted to Anthony Kennedy that
"even though you hold these particular philosophies, we also know there is no predict-
ability as to how you'll act when you get on the high court bench." Id. at 50. But this ac-
knowledgement did not stop Simpson from claiming to have a significant interest in
Kennedy's judicial philosophy. Id.
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formation to the Senators or other groups. Repeating the survey
with other groups, including groups with both more and less spe-
cialized knowledge, might yield interesting insights into how dif-
ferent audiences perceive the information presented at the hear-
ings. One might also use far more sophisticated methods of
content analysis and more detailed coding schemes to assess the
hearings, thus enabling a more context rich assessment of the
positions presented by the nominees.
A final point: in the end, we are not surprised by the rela-
tively weak correlations between statements made at the hear-
ings and subsequent judicial behavior. We expect that even more
nuanced research methodologies would yield similar results.
Confirmation hearings are, after all, a strategic environment
where Senators ask certain questions to please constituents and
nominees answer questions to land a job. The nominees' incen-
tives, therefore, are almost certainly to provide as little informa-
tion as possible. Moreover, even genuinely held interpretive
preferences may make very little difference in directing results in
actual cases. Our point, then, is not to generate astonishment at
the lack of correlation between nomination statements and judi-
cial performance, but to stimulate thinking on how the confirma-
tion hearings could be better structured to provide more reliable
predictors of judicial performance if, indeed, such predictors are
a desirable or feasible way of increasing judicial accountability.
These are the questions we hope this work provokes, and that fu-
ture researchers in this area will pursue.
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APPENDIX A
Breyer: Originalism
[120] Would you agree, then, that the meaning of the law is to be
ascertained according to the understanding of the law when it was en-
acted? A: Almost always. Almost always .... The reason that I hesitate
a little is because of course, there are instances, particularly with the
Constitution and other places, where it is so open and unclear as to just
how the Framers or the authors intended it.
[170] I think the Constitution is a set of incredibly important, in-
credible valuable principles, statements in simply language that have
enabled the country to exist for 200 years, and I hope and we believe
many hundreds of years more. That Constitution could not have done
that if, in fact, it was not able to have words that drew their meaning in
part from the conditions of the society that they govern. And, of
course, the conditions and changed conditions are relevant to deciding
what is and what is not rational in terms of the Constitution, as in the
terms of a statute or in any other rule of law.
[223] One goes back to history and the values that the Framers
enunciated. One looks to history and tradition, one looks to the prece-
dents that have emerged over time. One looks, as well, to what life is
like at the present, as well as the past. And one tries to use a bit of un-
derstanding as to what a holding one way or the other will mean for the
future.
[269] 1 think judges have started with text... They go back to the
history; they look at what the Framers intended; they look at traditions
over time; they look at how those traditions have worked out as history
has changed; and they are careful, they are careful, because eventu-
ally... other people will look back at the interpretations this genera-
tion writes if they are judges and they will say: were they right to say
that that ought permanently to have been the law? If the answer to that
question is yes, then the judges of today were right in finding that that
was a basic value that the Framers of the Constitution intended to have
enshrined.
[287] Where a clause is unclear, there is no escaping the require-
ment to find its meaning .... To find the meaning, you begin with the
text, but as you say, the text is very unclear in the example you are
thinking of. You go back into history, and you look at what the Fram-
ers are likely to have intended. And often-or at least sometimes, any-
way-that will not answer the question, because they may have in-
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tended the meaning to encapsulate certain important values, which
values may stay the same, but the conditions in which they are applied
may have changed. So you look to precedent, you look to tradition, and
you look to history if the case is really difficult. And you have to have
some understanding of the practical facts of how people live.
[287] Those are intellectual checks that try to make the factors
that I mentioned factors that do not unchain the personality of the
judge, that hold the judge back from legislating, but permit the Consti-
tution to adapt to changing circumstances in a way that I believe the
Framers intended.
[355] [W]hat the Framers thought is that the Constitution should
adapt, preserving certain basic values. So what are those values? And
we are back to where I started with a holistic approach .... I think the
word "dignity" is important. At the most basic level, the Preamble to
the Constitution lists what the Framers were up to-establish justice,
ensure domestic tranquility, proved for the common defense, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity.
[192] I cannot say that precedent always answers the question, but
it is terribly important to refer to the precedent, and the opinion grows
out of prior precedent. That is normal. The history is important as well,
both because it reflects an intent of the Framers and because it shows
how, over the course of 200 years, that intent has been interpreted by
others. The present and the past traditions of our people are important
because they can show how past language reflecting past values, which
values are permanent, apply in present circumstances. And some idea
of what an opinion either way will mean for the lives of the people
whose lives must reflect those values, both in the past and in the pre-
sent, and in the future, is important.
Kennedy: Originalism
[85] [T]he object of our inquiry is to use history, the case law, and
our understanding of the American constitutional tradition in order to
determine the intention of the document broadly expressed. One of the
reasons why, in my view, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States have such great acceptance by the American people is
because of the perception by the people that the Court is being faithful
to a compact that was made 200 years ago. The Framers sat down in a
room for three months .... The object of our inquiry is to see what that
documents means.
[138] The Framers, because they wrote a Constitution, I think well
understood that it was to apply to exigencies and circumstances and
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perhaps even crises that they could never foresee. So any theory which
is predicated on the intent the Framers had, what they actually thought
about, is just not helpful. Then you can go one step further on the pro-
gression and ask, well, should we decide the problem as if the Framers
had thought about it? But that does not seem to me to be very helpful
either. What I do think is that we can follow the intention of the Fram-
ers in a different sense. They did do something. They made certain
public acts. They wrote. They used particular words. They wanted
those words to be followed. We can see from history more clearly now,
I think, what the Framers intended, than if we were sitting back in
1789.... We have a great benefit, Senator, in that we have had 200
years of history. History is not irrelevant. History teaches us that the
Framers had some very specific ideas. As we move further away from
the Framers, their ideas seem almost more pure, more clarified, more
divorced from the partisan politics of their time than before. So a study
of the intentions and the purposes and the statements and the ideas of
the Framers seems to me, is a necessary starting point for any constitu-
tional decision.
[140] Q: Does this mean that you are in any way adverse to evolv-
ing interpretations of the Constitution that accommodate new technol-
ogy or current trends in society? A: [I] recognize that any State must
contain within it the ability to change in order to preserve those values
that [are deemed] essential. As applied to a judge, I think that it is con-
sistent with the idea that constitutional values are intended to endure
from generation to generation and from age to age.
[140] [T]he doctrine of original intent is not necessarily helpful as
a way to proceed in evaluating a case; but that really it is one of the
things that we want to know. The doctrine of original intent does not
tell us how to decide a case. Intention, though, is one of the objectives
of our inquiry. If we know what the Framers intended in the broad
sense that I have described, then we have a key to the meaning of the
document. I just did not think that original intent was very helpful as a
methodology, as a way of proceeding, because it just restates the ques-
tion.
[141] Original intent, broadly conceived as I have described it, is
extant in far more cases than we give it credit for. I think that in very
many cases, the ideas, the values, the principles, and rules set forth by
the Framers, area guide to the decisions. And I think they are a guide
that is sufficiently sure that the public, and the people accept the deci-
sions of the court as being valid for that reason. If there is not some his-
torical link to the ideas of the Framers, then the constitutional decision,
it seems to me, is in some doubt.... But I think that in almost all cases
there is an intent, at least broadly stated; the question is whether it is
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narrow enough to decide the particular case. It is, I think, an impera-
tive that a judge who announces a constitutional rule be quite confi-
dent, be quite confident, that it has an adequate basis in our system of
constitutional rule; and that means an adequate basis in the intention
of the Constitution.
[151] Well, I am not saying that the official purpose, the an-
nounced intention, the fundamental theory of the amendment as
adopted will in all cases be the sole determinant. But I think I am indi-
cating that it has far more force and far more validity and far more
breadth than simply what someone thought they were doing at the
time. I just do not think that the 14"' amendment was designed to freeze
into society all of the inequities that then existed. I simply cannot be-
lieve it.
[152] Q: Well, I agree with you about that, and I agree with you
about Brown v. Board being correctly decided. A: But that cannot be
because society has changed between 1878 and 1896... I think what
the Framers had in mind was to rise above their own inJustices. It
would serve no purpose to have a Constitution which simply enacted
the status quo.
[171] You look to see how the great Justices that have sat on the
court for years have understood and interpreted the Constitution, and
from that you get a sense of what the Constitution really means.
[230] [The] Court can use history in order to make the meaning of
the Constitution more clear. As the court has the advantage of a per-
spective of 200 years, the Constitution becomes clearer to it, not more
murky .... And this doesn't mean the Constitution changes. It just
means that we have a better perspective of it. This is no disparagement
of the Constitution. It is no disparagement of the idea that the inten-
tions and the purposes of the Framers should prevail. To say that new
generations yield new insights and new perspective does not mean the
Constitution changes. It just means that our understanding of it
changes. The idea that the Framers of the Constitution made a cove-
nant with the future is what our people respect and that is why they fol-
low the judgments of the Supreme Court, because they perceive that
we are implementing the understanding of the Framers. I am commit-
ted to that principle.
Thomas: Originalism
[135] I think, Senator, that the role of a judge is a limited one. It is
to interpret the intent of Congress, the legislation of Congress, to apply
that in specific cases, and to interpret the Constitution, where called
upon, but at no point to impose his or her will or his or her opinion in
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that process, but rather to go to the traditional tools of constitutional
interpretation, or adjudication, as well as to statutory construction, but
not, again, to impose his or her own point view or his or her predilec-
tions or preconceptions.
[179] But to understand what the Framers meant and what they
were trying to do, it is important to go back and attempt to understand
what they believed, just as we do when we attempt to interpret a stat-
ute that is drafted by this body, to get your understanding.
[238] I think that knowing what [the Founders] views are is a con-
text for understanding our Constitution, knowing what they believed in
is a context for understanding the separation of powers or perhaps
even understanding the notion of limited government and the rights of
individuals.... Now, the beliefs of the Founders could be part of the
history or tradition to which we look, but you do not make an inde-
pendent search of natural law, and I have not suggested that.
[273] How do we look at history and tradition, how do we deter-
mine how our country has advanced and grown, it is a very difficult en-
terprise. It is an amorphous process at times, but it is an important
process.
[274] I also indicated that the concept doesn't stop there, it is not
frozen in time. Our notions of what [the liberty clause of the 14th
Amendment] means evolves with the country, it moves with our history
and our tradition.
[274] The concept [of natural law] is a broad concept... maybe
that is one of the reasons the Founders used that concept. It is one that
evolves over time. I don't think that they could have determined in
1866 what the term in its totality would mean for the future.... but in
constitutional adjudication, what the courts have attempted to do is to
look at the ideals, to look at the values that we share as a culture, and
those values and ideals have evolved, in that specific provisions have
evolved over time.
[277] Q: So, natural law does impact on the adjudication of cases?
A: To the extent that the Framers believed it. Q: We both admit, you
looking at the Framers and me looking at the Framers, we may come to
two different conclusions of what they meant by natural law. A: But we
also agree that the provisions that they chose were broad provisions,
that adjudicating through our history and tradition, using our history
and tradition evolve.
[393] And as I have indicated and the Court has attempted to do,
attempted to root the interpretation or analysis in those areas in history
and tradition of this country, the liberty component of the due process
clause, and I think that that is an appropriate restraint on judges.
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Stevens: Originalism
[42] And to the extent that open areas remain in our Constitution,
and inevitably a large number do... the judge, I think, has the duty,
really, to do two things. One, to do his best to understand what was in-
tended in this kind of situation, and yet to realize that our society does
change and to try to decide the case in a context that was not com-
pletely understood and envisioned by those who drafted the particular
set of rules .... I think he has to be guided by history, by tradition, by
his best understanding of what was intended by the Framers, and yet he
also must understand that he is living in a different age in which some
of the considerations that happen today must inevitably affect what he
does.
[44] [O]ne must study the document, the language used, and the
intent of the Framers, and the way in which one thinks the Framers
would have sized up the problem now presented.
[72] And I think there is certainly some truth to the notion that
one has to consider both the social conditions at the time the amend-
ment was adopted or the intent of the Framers and the background in
which a particular punishment is being given out today.
Rehnquist: Originalism
[CJ-132] I think a judge has the obligation, when sitting in a Fed-
eral system like ours under a written Constitution, to attempt to use
every bit of information and every method he can in order to find out
what the Constitution means. Certainly a large part of this is the writ-
ten word that the Framers used, not the undisclosed intentions of the
Framers, but the words that they used.
[CJ-279] Well, there are a number of provisions in the Constitu-
tion that are sufficiently general so that they have application far be-
yond what the Framers, the people who ratified the Constitution, had
before them at the time. In 1787, there was not a steamboat, there was
not a railroad, there was not an airplane; yet they gave Congress no
power over buggies or over post roads; they said Congress shall have
the power to regulate commerce among the several States. And that
provision is obviously broad enough to embrace any number of things
that have come after .... The fact that there were not any public
schools in 1787 does not mean that those clauses of broad general ap-
plicability would not have application where appropriate to institutions
that have come after the Framers.
[AJ-55] My notion would be that one attempts to ascertain a con-
stitutional meaning... by use of the language used by the Framers, the
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historical materials available, and the precedents which other Justices
of the Supreme Court have decided in cases involving a particular pro-
vision.
[AJ-81] Well, I think the Framers drafted a document... which
was capable of forming a framework of government, not just in 1789,
but in our own day. And there is no question in my mind that the prin-
ciples laid down then, as subsequently interpreted, must be applied to
very changed conditions which occur now rather than then. But, I think
even now it is to the Constitution and to its authentic interpretation
that we must turn in solving constitutional problems, rather than to
simply an outside desire to be "in step with the time."
[AJ-138] I think that in interpreting the Constitution, one goes
first to the document itself, to the historical materials that may be
available, casting light on what the Framers may have intended, and to
the decisions made by the Supreme Court construing it.
O'Connor: Originalism
[67] I do not believe that it is the function of the judiciary to step
in and change the law because the times have changes or the social mo-
res have changed... I believe that on occasion the Court has reached
changed results interpreting a given provision of the Constitution based
on its research of what the true meaning of the provision is-based on
the intent of the Framers, its research on the history of that particular
provision. I was not intending to suggest that those changes were being
made because some other branch had failed to make the change as a
matter of social policy.
[841 Obviously the Constitution is the basic document to which
the Justices must refer in rendering decisions on constitutional law. In
analyzing a question of intent of the Framers of that document is vitally
important.
[102] I think there was an element indeed of the examination of
the intent of the drafters of the [14th] amendment. I am sure that par-
ticular case [Brown] was impacted also by perceptions of the social im-
pacts the that particular instance. What I was trying to say was that in
some cases in which our Court has reached a contrary result after a pe-
riod of years to a previous decision they do so occasionally based on a
reexamination of the legislative history and of the intent of the Framers
in an effort to determine whether the prior determination was correct.
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Scalia: Originalism
[37] Let us assume that somebody runs in from Princeton Univer-
sity, and on the basis of the latest historical research, he or she has dis-
covered a lost document which shows that it was never intended that
the Supreme Court should have the authority to declare a statute un-
constitutional. I would not necessarily reverse Marbury v. Madison on
the basis of something like that. To some extent, Government even at
the Supreme Court level is a practical exercise. There are some things
that are done, and when they are done, they are done and you move
on.
[48] I cannot say that I have a fully framed omnibus view of the
Constitution. Now there are those who do have written pieces on con-
stitutional interpretation, and here is the matrix, and here is how you
do it. I think it is fair to say you would not regard me as someone who
would be likely to use the phrase, living Constitution. On the other
hand, I am not sure you can say, he is pure and simply an original
meaning .... What I think is that the Constitution is obviously not
meant to be evolvable so easily that in effect a court of nine judges can
treat it as though it is a bring-along-with-me statute and fill it up with
whatever content the current times seem to require. To a large degree,
it is intended to be an insulation against the current times, against the
passions of the moment that may cause individual liberties to be disre-
garded, and it has served that function valuably very often. So I would
never use the phrase, living Constitution. Now, there is within that
phrase, however, the notion that a certain amount of development of
constitutional doctrine occurs, and I think there is room for that. I
frankly-the strict original intentist, I think would say that even such a
clause as the cruel and unusual punishment clause would have to mean
precisely the same thing today that it meant in 1789 ... so that if lash-
ing was fine then, lashing would be fine now. I am not sure I agree with
that. I think that there are some provisions of the Constitution that
may have a certain amount of evolutionary content within them. I have
never been-what should I say-as I said earlier, I have not developed
a full constitutional matrix. You are right though, in suspecting me to
be more inclined to the original meaning that I am to a phrase like "liv-
ing Constitution."
[88-89] Q: [T]he Supreme Court throughout history has had the
responsibility to declare that certain widely accepted practices violate
the Constitution-for example, deciding that segregated schools were
unconstitutional, and that legislative districts had to be apportioned
fairly. Are you saying that as a Supreme Court Justice, you would op-
pose decisions which prohibited widely accepted practice? A: There is
an ongoing debate that has always been ongoing, but it is more publicly
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known now, about strict constructionism verses a more evolutionary
theory of the Constitution. And I am speaking particularly about deci-
sions of the court that give content to provisions of the Constitution
that are not sufficiently explicit to strike down particular practices. If a
practice that constitutes plainly racial discrimination existed in all the
States, it would make no difference whether it existed from the begin-
ning of the 14th Amendment down to the present. If it is facially con-
trary to the language, obviously, there is no problem ... [Jjudges have
authority to give such content, no doubt, but I do not know how a
judge intuits that a particular practice is contrary to our most funda-
mental beliefs, to the most fundamental beliefs of our society, when it
is one that was in existence when the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was adopted and is still in existence .... I would find it very diffi-
cult... to strike down a provision on the basis of substantive due proc-
ess ... where it is a provision that State legislatures generally adopted
at the time the 14th amendment was passed and continue to generally
adopt.... I am not comfortable with imposing my moral views on so-
ciety. I need something to look to. And what I look to is the under-
standing of the people. A strict constructionist would say use only the
understanding at the time of the 14th Amendment. The evolutionist
would say no, the understanding today as well. Whichever of those two
you use-and as I said in some earlier questioning, I am a little wishy-
washy on that point-but whichever of the two you use, it seems to me
that either one or the other has to reflect the new right you have found.
[104] But, as I've said, some cases that are so old, even if you
waived in my face a document proving that they were wrong when de-
cided in 1803, I think you'd have to say, sorry, too late.
[108] Q: What is your approach to [original intent]? A: Well, it is
where I start from, Senator. I think the first step is to-and I use the
term "original meaning" rather than "original intent," which is maybe
something of a quibble, but I think that one is bound by the meaning of
the Constitution to the society to which it was promulgated. And if
somebody should discover that the secret intent of the Framers was
quite different from what the words seem to connote, it would not
make any difference. In any case, I start from the original meaning, and
I think there is room for dispute as to what extent some of those ele-
ments of meaning are evolvable, such as the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause. The starting point, in any case, is the text of the document
and what it meant to the society that adopted it. I think it is part of my
whole philosophy, which is essentially a democratic philosophy that
even the Constitution is, at bottom ... a democratic document. It was
adopted by the people's acceptance of it, by their voting for it, and its
legitimacy depends upon democratic adoption at the time it was en-
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acted. Now, some of its provisions may have envisioned varying appli-
cation with varying circumstances. That is a subject of some dispute
and a point on which I am quite wishy-washy. But I am clear on the
fact that the original meaning is the starting point and the beginning of
wisdom.
Ginsburg: Originalism
[118] I think the Framers are shortchanged if we view them as
having a limited view of rights, because they wrote, Thomas Jefferson
wrote, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unal-
ienable rights, that among these"-among these-"are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness," and that government is formed to protect
and secure these rights.
[119] Now, it is true-and it is a point I made in the Madison Lec-
ture-that the immediate implementation in the days of the Founding
Fathers in many respects was limited. "We the people" was not then
what it is today. The most eloquent speaker on that subject was Justice
Thurgood Marshall, during the series of bicentennial celebrations,
when songs in full praise of the Constitution were sung. Justice Mar-
shall reminded us that the Constitution's immediate implementation,
even its text, had certain limitations, blind spots, blots on our record.
But he said that the beauty of this Constitution is that, through a com-
bination of judicial interpretation, constitutional amendment, laws
passed by Congress, "We the people" has grown ever larger. So now it
includes people who were once held in bondage. It includes women
who were left out of the political community at the start. I hope that
begins to answer your question. The view of the Framers, their large
view, I think was expansive. Their immediate view was tied to the cir-
cumstances in which they lived.
[127] Q: What about this statement: The only legitimate way for a
judge to go about defining the law is by attempting to discern what
those who made the law intended. A: I think all people could agree
with that. But as I tried to say in response to the chairman's question,
trying to divine what the Framers intended, I must look at that matter
two ways. One is what they might have intended immediately for their
day, and the other is their larger expectation that the Constitution
would govern, as Cardozo said, not for the passing hour, but for the
expanding future. And I know of no better illustration of that than to
take the words of the great man who wrote the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Thomas Jefferson said: Were our state a pure democracy,
there would still be excluded from our deliberations women who, to
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prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity of issues, should not mix
promiscuously in gatherings of men." Nonetheless, I do believe that
Thomas Jefferson, were he alive today, would say that women are
equal citizens .... So I see an immediate intent about how an ideal is
going to be recognized at a given time and place, but also a larger aspi-
ration as our society improves. I think the Framers were intending to
create a more perfect union that would become ever more perfect over
time.
[127-128] The judge has a law-whether it is a statute that Congress
passed or our highest law, the Constitution-to construe, to interpret,
and must try to be faithful to the provision. But it is no secret that some
of these provisions are not self-defining. There is nothing a judge
would like better than to be able to look at a text and say this text is
clear and certain, I do not have to go beyond it to comprehend its
meaning. But often that is not the case, and then a judge must do more
than just read the specific words. The judges will read on to see what
else is in the law and read back to see what was there earlier. The judge
will look at precedent, to see how the words in this provision or in simi-
lar provisions have been construed. The effort is always to relate to the
intent of the lawgiver or the lawmaker, but sometimes that intent is ob-
scure.
[189] It is part of our history-a sad part of our history, Sena-
tor.. ., but undeniably part of our history-that the 14th amendment,
that great amendment that changed so much in this Nation, was not in-
tended by its Framers immediately to change the status of women. ...
Times changed, and eventually, after nearly a century of struggle,
women achieved the vote. They became full citizens. And many people
thought that when women became full citizens, entitled to the vote,
they had achieved equality. The vote should have qualified women as
full and equal citizens with men, entitled to the same equal protection
before the laws. [Y]es, it took bold and dynamic interpretation in view
of what the Framers of the 14th Amendment intended. The Framers of
the 14th amendment meant no change, they intended no change at all
in the status of women before the law. But in 1920, when women
achieved the vote, they became full citizens, and you have to read the
Constitution as a whole, changed, as Thurgood Marshall said, over the
years by amendment and by judicial construction.
[221] The point was that, at last, the country had come to appreci-
ate that women were full and equal citizens with men; that the percep-
tion of women's place that marked the 19th century and the 18th cen-
tury had become obsolete; that when the 19th amendment gave women
the right to vote, they become full and equal citizens entitled to the
same protection mean had under the 14th amendment.
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[239] Q: [D]oes the nominee wish to interpret the Constitution as
a static document, or... wish the Court to initiate creative changes or
creative new approaches? A: I have said that I associate myself with
Justice Cardozo who said our Constitution was made not for the pass-
ing hour but for the expanding future. I believe that is what the Found-
ing Fathers intended.
[303] I also said what a judge should take account of is not the
weather of the day, but the climate of an era. The climate of the age,
yes, but not the weather of the day, not what the newspaper is report-
ing.
Souter: Originalism
[128-129] I have tended to shy away from the use of the term
"original intent" in describing any approach of mine. I have done so,
because the phrase "original intent" has frequently been used to mean
that the meaning or the application of a constitutional provision should
be confined only to those specific examples that were intended to be
the objects of its application when it was, in fact, adopted .... I do not
believe that the appropriate criterion of constitutional meaning is this
sense of specific intent, that you may never apply a provision to any
subject except the subject specifically intended by the people who
adopted it .... If you were to confine the equal protection clause only
to those subjects which its Framers and its adopters intended it to apply
to, it could not have been applied to school desegregation.... The rea-
son Brown was correctly decided is not because they intended to apply
the equal protection clause to school desegregation, but because they
did not confine the equal protection clause to those specific or a spe-
cifically enumerated list of applications, the equal protection clause is,
by its very terms, a clause of general application. What we are looking
for, then, when we look for its original meaning is the principle that
was intended to be applied, and if that principle is broad enough to ap-
ply to school desegregation, as it clearly was, then that was an appro-
priate application for it and Brown was undoubtedly correctly decided.
[161-162] [T]he interpretive position that I start with when I am
looking at a provision which has not been construed is one of original
meaning, and in my discussion yesterday I distinguished that from the
theory that would confine that meaning to those applications which
were originally and specifically intended by the Framers or by the
adopters of that provision to be its application .... But my interpretive
position is not one that original intent is controlling, but that original
meaning is controlling ..... [T]he ultimate criterion of meaning for
me ... [is] not specific intent, but the principle intended.
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[231-232] [I]n dealing with the question of what enumerated rights
may be regarded as fundamental and what require a lesser standard of
scrutiny, the courts from time to time have tried different tests.... I
think I indicated my own view of the best approach to these problems
is the one which is probably best identified with the late Justice Harlan.
Justice Harlan said that we cannot approach these questions of weigh-
ing the value of asserted rights without an inquiry into the history and
traditions of the American people, in order to try to find on a histori-
cally demonstrable basis their commitment to a set of values which ei-
ther do or do not support the claim that a particular right in question is
fundamental.
[235] My approach to interpretation is not a specific intent ap-
proach. The approach has got to take into consideration the text of the
provisions in question and it is not to be confined, the meaning of that
text is not to be confined by reference simply to the specific applica-
tions that may have been, as it were, in the mind either individually or
institutionally of the people who proposed the amendment. We are
looking, when we look for original meaning, we are looking for mean-
ing and for principle. We are not confining ourselves simply to imme-
diately intended application.
[266] Q: Now, let us assume for a moment that this original intent
school of thought is historically correct-that, as many argue very
strongly, the Framers did have a very narrow view of the establishment
clause-would this lead you to modify the principle of neutrality that
has been accepted by the Supreme Court for decades? A: It would lead
me to raise the question but it would not give me the answer. There are
basically two other considerations. The first in this, as in any such case,
is the claim of precedent. The second consideration which may fall, to a
degree, under the claim of precedent, which is, at least, I think worth
stating, stating separately, is whether, in fact, assuming that was the
view of the Framers, the best way to affect it today is the way that the
Court has, in fact, already taken. So that I do not regard the issue in
this or in any other case as simply being a simple issue of what exactly
was the original understanding because we are not being asked to ad-
judicate on a clean slate.
[267] [L]et's assume that we found that the establishment clause
had a very narrow intended meaning. Do we ignore, essentially, the
development of the law for the last 40 [years] ... Or the last 200 years?
The answer is, no, we don't deal with constitutional problems that way.
[277] In the search for a content to the concept of privacy, we are
not really looking for something new, as opposed to something which
the constitutions assumed. We are looking for the principle that was
intended to be recognized. The material on which we are going to base
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our conclusions is basically the corpus of material that we regard as re-
liable evidence about the understanding of the limits of State or, in ap-
propriate cases, national power. Those limits in those materials include
everything from things like Federalist Papers, debates, philosophical
treatises of the times in question, which reflected a concept of limited
power, and we certainly do not ignore the precedents of the Court that
over the years have tried to treat with the subject.
[303] I mentioned that when I speak of original intent, or the in-
tentionalist school, I am talking particularly about that view that the
meaning of the provision or the application of the provision should
somehow be confined to those specific instances or the provision
should somehow be confined to those specific instances or problems
which were in the minds of those who adopted and ratified the provi-
sion, and that the provision should be applied only to those instances or
problems. I do not accept that view.... Principles don't change, but
our perceptions of the world around us and the need for those princi-
ples do.
Thomas: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[135] I think overruling a case or reconsidering a case, Senator, is
a very serious matter. Certainly, the case would have to be-you would
have to be of the view that a case is incorrectly decided, but I think
even that is not adequate. There are some cases that you may not agree
with that should not be overruled. Stare decisis provides continuity to
our system, it provides predictability, and in our process of case-by-
case decision making, I think it is a very important and critical concept,
and I think that a judge has the burden. A judge that wants to recon-
sider a case and certainly one who wants to overrule a case has the
burden of demonstrating that not only is the case indirect, but that it
would be appropriate, in view of stare decisis, to make that additional
step of overruling that case.
[246] I think that the principle of stare decisis, the concept of stare
decisis, is an important link in our system of deciding cases in our sys-
tem of judicial jurisprudence. The reason I think it is important is this:
we have got to have continuity if there is going to be any reliance, if
there is going to be any chain in our case law. I think that the first point
in any revisiting of the case is that the case be wrongly decided, that
one thing it is incorrect. But more than that is necessary before one can
rethink it or attempt to reconsider it. And I think that the burden is on
the individual or on the judge or the Justice who thinks that a prece-
dent should be overruled to demonstrate more than its mere incorrect-
ness. And at least one factor that would weigh against overruling a
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precedent would be the development of institutions as a result of a
prior precedent having been in place. But, again, I think the first step is
that the precedent be incorrect, and the second step in the analysis has
to be more than the mere incorrectness of that precedent.
[339] In the statutory area of law, in the case law involving stat-
utes, there seems to be less of an inclination on the part of judges to re-
consider or overrule cases, primarily because of the view or the feeling
that if it were wrong to begin with, then the legislature would have cor-
rected it, and I think that sort of underscores the point that Senator [X]
was making yesterday about revisiting statutory interpretation cases or
precedent. In the area of constitutional cases or constitutional law
cases, at least those cases are very, very, important, but the feeling is or
the sentiment is on the part of the court that those cases can only be
revisited in a realistic way by the judiciary, since the amendment proc-
ess is one that is very remote, as far as the possibility of occurring, and
that those cases are more likely to be revisited or reconsidered. Again,
I don't think there is precise calculus in approaching those two areas. I
do think that you start with the case being wrong, one has to view that
case as wrong, and I think one has to understand and take into account
the continuity in our legal system, and has to understand or I think
demonstrate why this continuity should in some way be broken. I don't
think that is necessarily an easy task, and it is certainly one that should
be considered with a high level of seriousness and high level of concern
about what the judge is doing, even if the case is found to be wrong.
[420] Senator, I think it is important for any judge to take into ac-
count, even when he or she disagrees with a particular case, to recog-
nize that there is the additional burden and additional question of
whether or not this case should be overruled; that is a question about
the doctrine of stare decisis. I do not think that judges should assume,
simply because they disagree with a particular case, that we are operat-
ing as though there was no prior case law or there are no precedents
and feel free to act as though they are not in any way controlled or re-
strained or constrained by prior case law. My sentiments, without ex-
pressing a particular judgment on that case, my sentiments would be
toward a preferences for recognizing that there is a significant weight
to be given to existing case law and that the burden is on the judge who
wants to change that precedent, to not only show why it is wrong, but
why stare decisis should not apply.
Kennedy: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[135] In any case, Senator, the role of the judge is to approach the
subject with an open mind, to listen to the counsel, to look at the facts
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of the particular case, to see what the injury is, see what the hurt is, to
see what the claim is, and then to listen to his or her colleagues, and
then to research the law. What does the most recent precedent, the
precedent that is before the Court if it is being examined for a possible
overruling, and what does that precedent say? What is its logic? What
is its reasoning? What has been its acceptance by the lower courts? Has
the rule proven to be workable? Does the rule fit with what the judge
deems to be the purpose of the Constitution as we have understood it
over the last 200 years? History is tremendously important in this re-
gard.
[135] Now, as you well appreciate, and as you certainly know,
Senator, stare decisis is not an automatic mechanism. We do not just
pull a stare decisis lever or not pull it in any particular case. Stare de-
cisis is really a description of the whole judicial process that proceeds
on a case by case basis as judges slowly and deliberately decide the
facts of a particular case, and hope their decision yields a general prin-
ciple that may be of assistance to themselves and to later courts.
[136] Stare decisis ensures impartiality. That is one of its principle
uses. It ensures that from case to case, from judge to judge, from age to
age, the law will have a stability that the people can understand and
rely upon, that judges can understand and rely upon, and that attorneys
can understand and rely upon. That is a very, very important part of
the system.
[136] Now there have been discussions that stare decisis should
not apply as rigidly in the constitutional area as in other areas. The ar-
gument for that is that there is no other overruling body in the constitu-
tional area. In a stare decisis problem involving a non-constitutional
case, the Senate and the House of Representatives can tell us we are
wrong by passing a bill. That cannot happen in the constitutional case.
On the other hand, it seems to me that when judges have announced
that a particular rule is found in the Constitution; it is entitled to very
great weight. The court does two things: it interprets history and it
makes history. It has got to keep those two roles separate. Stare decisis
helps it to do that.
[171] This is what stare decisis is all about. You look to see how
the great Justices that have sat on the court for years have understood
and interpreted the Constitution, and from that you get a sense of what
the Constitution really means. An English representative in the House
of Commons once said that "history is philosophy teaching by exam-
ple"; and I think that the law can be described the same way.
[230] As you know, Senator, stare decisis has an element of cer-
tainty to it, which most Latin phrases do, but it really is a description of
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the entire legal process. Stare decisis is the guarantee of impartiality. It
is the basis upon which the case system proceeds, and without it we are
simply going from day to day with no stability, with no contact with our
past. And so stare decisis is very important, but, obviously, if a case is
illogical, if it cannot be reconciled with all the parallel precedent, if it
appears that it is simply out of accord with the purposes of the Consti-
tution, then it must be overruled.
Breyer: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[192] I cannot say that precedent always answers the question, but
it is terribly important to refer to the precedent, and the opinion grows
out of prior precedent. That is normal.
[291] My view is that stare decisis is very important to the law.
Obviously, you can't have a legal system that doesn't operate with a lot
of weight given to stare decisis, because people build their lives, they
build their lives on what they believe to be the law. And insofar as you
begin to start overturning things, you upset the lives of men, women,
children, people all of the country. So be careful, because people can
adjust, and even when something is wrong, they can adjust to it. And
once they have adjusted, be careful of fooling with their expectation.
[291] [I]t seems to me that there are identifiable factors that are
pretty well established. If you, as a judge, are thinking of overturning
or voting to overturn a preexisting case, what you do is ask a number of
fairly specific questions. How wrong do you think that prior precedent
really was as a matter of law, that is, how badly reasoned was it? You
ask yourself how the law has changed since, all the adjacent laws, all
the adjacent rules and regulations, does it no longer fit. You ask your-
self how have the facts changed, has the world changed in very impor-
tant ways. You ask yourself, insofar, irrespective of how wrong that
prior decision was as a matter of reasoning, how has it worked out in
practice, has it proved impossible or very difficult to administer, has it
really confused matters. Finally, you look to the degree of reliance that
people have had in their ordinary lives on that previous precedent.
[291] Those [the above considerations] are the kinds of questions
you ask. I think you ask those questions in relation to statues. I think
you ask those questions in relation to the Constitution. The real differ-
ence between the two areas is that Congress can correct a constitu-
tional court, if it is a a statutory question, but it can't make a correc-
tion, if it is a constitutional matter. So be pretty careful.
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Rehnquist: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[CJ-227] Q: Do you believe that it is your responsibility to keep
voicing your view on an issue even if stare decisis leads the Court to
decide a specific case in another way? A: I think generally, yes, Sena-
tor, that if one sees a constitutional case issue a particular way and
simply is not persuaded, that in most cases it is a part of function of a
judge to say something in dissent. I think on statutory cases, it may be
somewhat different. The ballgame is over when the Supreme Court de-
cides a statutory case. Congress can change the result if they do not like
it. And I think there, a dissent, particularly a sole dissent, has a good
deal less to be said for it.
[CJ-270] Stare decisis is the principle, of course, that... once the
Supreme Court has decided a case, that that decision settles the law for
the future. And I think... when you are looking at a statutory ques-
tion-that is, let us suppose that in 1950, the Supreme Court has said
that a particular Act of Congress means thus-and-so, and now...
someone is coming back and saying, "Well, the Court was wrong in
1950. If you really look at the legislative history and construe the words
the way they ought to be construed, it did not mean thus-and-so." I
think every responsible judge would reject that sort of an attack, except
under the most extraordinary situation, because when you are talking
about a statute, Congress can change the result if it does not like the
conclusion the court reaches. If you turn to a similar constitutional
question that perhaps was decided in 1950, and now you are urged to
reverse it and overturn it..., there is more flexibility, more play in the
joints, but still a very strong presumption in favor of the earlier deci-
sion, it seems to me. But nonetheless, the stare decisis principle has a
more flexible application when you are talking about constitutional de-
cisions than when you are talking about simple statutory decisions.
[AJ-19] I feel that great weight should be given to precedent. I
think the Supreme Court has said many times that it is perhaps entitled
to perhaps somewhat less weight in the field of constitutional law than
it is in other areas of the law. But, nonetheless, I believe great weight
should be given to it. I think that the fact that the Court was unanimous
in handing down a precedent makes a precedent stronger than if a
court was 5 to 4 in handing down the precedent. And I think the fact
that a precedent has stood for a very long time, or has been reexam-
ined by a succeeding number of judges, gives it added weight.
[AJ-55] [T]o the extent that a precedent is not that authoritative
in the sense of having stood for a shorter period of time, or having been
handed down by a sharply divided court, then it is of less weight as a
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precedent. This is not to say that there is not a presumption in favor of
precedent in every instance.
[AJ-138] I think it is important in constitutional law although I
think traditionally it is regarded as less binding in the area of constitu-
tional law than it is, for example, in the area of statutory construction. I
think it is nonetheless important and an important factor to be consid-
ered because basically it represents the judgment of what nine other
Justices who took the oath of office to faithfully administer the Consti-
tution thought it meant on the facts before them then. And I think any
decision rendered in that matter is entitled to great weight by a subse-
quent Court in considering the same question.
[AJ-168] I think one would approach a unanimous decision, par-
ticularly one that has been reexamined and reaffirmed, with the great-
est deference. That doesn't say you never decide otherwise.
[AJ-168] Again, an 8-to-I decision is not one lightly to be disre-
garded, but nonetheless, if upon reexamination giving the weight that
you ought to give to a precedent it appears wrong, then it is wrong.
Stevens: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[40] I think there would be times when the Court might be called
upon to reexamine earlier decisions which might have been incorrectly
decided. But I think it is still an important value and perhaps particu-
larly so at the national level because there is so much more reliance on
past decisions in the Federal system when it is a decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court .... [T]here is important value in a system of law which
is largely developed on a case-by-case basis to give appropriate respect
to that which has been decided before, but yet there are occasions
when the desirability of certainty and predictability is outweighed by
other factors.
[40] I would say that I certainly would weigh very carefully any
decision that had already been reached by a prior Court and I would be
most reluctant to depart from prior precedent without a clear showing
that departure was warranted. I would feel bound, but not absolutely
100-percent bound; I think I could not, in good conscience, say that. I
think there are occasions, particularly in constitutional adjudication,
where it is necessary to recognize that a prior decision may have been
erroneous and should be reexamined.
[41] [I]t is my understanding that decisions that appeared to be
unanimous in prior years were not, in fact, always so. There are private
papers of some of the Justices that indicate that it was more customary
then than it has been in recent years for Justices to go along with the
majority opinion rather than to voice dissent. So sometimes the unani-
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mous opinion is somewhat deceptive and I think one has to be a little
bit careful about overstating reliance on the factor of unanimity. But I
would agree that to the extent that the decision was unanimous rather
than closely divided you would tend to give more respect to it and feel
more comfortable in figuring that it really did command a unanimous
view. And also I think in the 5-to-4 decisions usually the countervailing
argument is spelled out in some detail so you have, right on the face of
the decision, reasons to consider the opposite conclusion as well.
O'Connor: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[83] Stare decisis of course is a crucial question with respect to any
discussion of the Supreme Court and its work. I think most people
would agree that stability of the law and predictability of the law are
vitally important concepts. Justice Cardozo pointed out the chaos that
would result if we decided every case on a case-by-case basis without
regard to precedent . It would make administration of justice virtually
impossible. Therefore, it plays a very significant role in our legal sys-
tem. We are guided, indeed, at the Supreme Court level and in other
courts by the concept that we will follow previously decided cases
which are in point. Now at the level of the Supreme Court where we
are dealing with a matter of constitutional law as opposed to a matter
of interpretation of congressional statute, there has been some sugges-
tion made that the role of stare decisis is a little bit different in the
sense that if the Court is deciding a case concerning the interpretation,
for example, of a congressional act and the Court renders a decision,
and if Congress feels that decision was wrong, then Congress itself can
enact further amendments to make adjustments. Therefore, we are not
without remedies in that situation. Whereas, if what the Court decided
is a matter of constitutional interpretation and that is the last word,
then the only remedy, as you have already indicated, is either for an
amendment to the Constitution to be offered or for the Court itself to
either distinguish its holdings or somehow change them. We have seen
this process occur throughout the Court's history. There are instances
in which the Justices of the Supreme Court have decided after examin-
ing a problem or a given situation that their previous decision or the
previous decisions of the Court in that particular matter were based on
faulty reasoning or faulty analysis or otherwise a flawed interpretation
of the law. In that instance they have the power, and indeed the obliga-
tion if they so believe, to overturn that previous decision and issue a
decision that they feel correctly reflects the appropriate constitutional
interpretation. What I am saying in effect is, it is not cast in stone but
very important.
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[84] 1 am sure that in each instance it is a very significant thing for
a Justice to overturn precedent, particularly that of long standing.
Scalia: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[32] The Supreme Court is bound to its earlier decisions by the
doctrine of stare decisis in which I strongly believe.
[37] Q: Well, what weight do you give the precedents of the Su-
preme Court? A: It depends upon the nature of the precedent, the na-
ture of the issue. Let us assume that somebody runs in from Princeton
University, and on the basis of the latest historical research, he or she
has discovered a lost document which shows that it was never intended
that the Supreme Court should have the authority to declare a statute
unconstitutional. I would not necessarily reverse Marbury v. Madison
on the basis of something like that. To some extent, Government even
at the Supreme Court level is a practical exercise. There are some
things that are done, and when they are done, they are done and you
move on. Now, which of those you think are so woven in the fabric of
law that mistakes made are too late to correct, and which are not, that
is a difficult question to answer. It can only be answered in the context
of a particular case, and I do not think I should answer anything in the
context of a particular case.
[45] Q: [A Supreme Court Justice] said that a precedent might be
less authoritative if it had stood for a shorter period of time or if it was
a decision by a sharply divide court. ... Would you agree with that
general sentiment? A: Well, I think the length of time is a considerably
important factor. The Marbury v. Madison example that I gave in re-
sponse to [a previous question.] I am not sure that I agree with [the
Justice] that the closeness of the prior decision makes that much differ-
ence. I mean, if Marbury v. Madison had been 5 to 4, I am not sure I
would reverse it today. But I can understand how some judges might
consider that that is an appropriate factor as well. I agree-I certainly
agree with the former. The latter would not have occurred to me, but
maybe.
[104] I agree with the statement that longstanding cases are more
difficult to overrule than recent cases .... [A]s I've said, some cases
that are so old, even if you waived a document in my face proving that
they were wrong when decided in 1803, I think you'd have to say, sorry,
too late.
Ginsburg: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[197-198] The soundness of the reasoning is certainly a considera-
tion [in a sound theory of stare decisis]. But we shouldn't abandon a
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precedent just because we think a different solution more rational. Jus-
tice Brandeis said some things are better settled than settled right, es-
pecially when the legislature sits. So if a precedent settles the construc-
tion of a statute, stare decisis means more than attachment to the
soundness of the reasoning. Reliance interests are important; the stabil-
ity, certainty, predictability of the law is important. If people know
what the law is, they can make their decisions, set their course in ac-
cordance with that law. So the importance of letting the matter stay de-
cided means judges should not discard precedent simply because they
later conclude it would have been better to have decided the case the
other way. That is not enough. If it is a decision that concerns the Con-
stitution ... then the Court knows the legislature, in many cases, can't
come to the rescue. If the judges got it wrong, it may be that they must
provide the correction. But even in constitutional adjudication, stare
decisis is one of the restraints against a judge infusing his or her own
values into the interpretation of the Constitution .... One of the things
Brandeis said when he overruled Swift v. Tyson in Erie was that the
Swift regime had proved unworkable. "Is it working" is a major consid-
eration regarding stare decisis. Reliance interests did not support re-
taining Swift because there was no stable law to rely on. What had
been generated was confusion and uncertainty. Private actors didn't
know whether the law governing their transaction would be the law as
declared by the Federal court or the law declared by the State court,
until they had a disagreement and litigation commenced. So how has a
precedent worked in practice? What about reliance interests? Those
things count, as well as the soundness of the decision. Stare decisis is
also important because it keeps judges from infusing their own value
judgments into the law.
[198] Q: [For purposes of stare decisis, do] you have some feeling
that criminal law ought to be put on the same par and on the same
equal basis as commercial or property law? A: I don't think that reli-
ance is absent from the criminal law field. Recall that precedent is set
for the way the courts will behave, the way the police will behave, the
way prosecutors will behave. One can't say that, in criminal law, reli-
ance doesn't count. Adhering to precedent fosters the stability, the cer-
tainty, the clarity of the law; stare decisis across the board serves those
purposes. We have distanced ourselves from the British practice which,
until very recently, so solidly entrenched stare decisis that the House of
Lords, the Law Lords, would not overrule any precedent. That rigidity
became unworkable and the Law Lords admit some leeway. But stare
decisis is a firm principle of our law and important in all areas.
[317] I believe, too, that stare decisis has an important role to play
in constitutional interpretation .... One doesn't lightly overrule prece-
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dent even in the constitutional area. But Brandeis made an obvious
point, although he said it so well. Correction can come by legislation if
the Court messes up on a matter of statutory interpretation. That often
can't be done when the question is one of constitutional interpretation.
[318] Yes, [time and acceptance are major factors to be consid-
ered before overturning a past decision]. How [has] it been working?
What expectations, what reliance interests has the decision generated?
Those are major factors.
Souter: Stare Decisis/Precedent
[67-68] [T]he doctrine of stare decisis which we speak of in that
shorthand kind of way is a series of considerations which courts bear in
mind in deciding whether a prior precedent should be followed or
should not be. Some such doctrine or some such rule is a bedrock ne-
cessity if we are going to have in our judicial systems anything that can
be called the rule of law as opposed simply to random decisions on a
case-to-case basis. The problem that the doctrine of stare decisis ad-
dresses is the problem of trying to give a proper value to a given prece-
dent when someone asks a court to overrule it and to go another
way....
The first thing, kind of the threshold question that, of course, you
start with on any issue of precedent, is the question of whether the
prior case was wrong. We don't raise precedential issues unless we are
starting with the assumption that there is something inappropriate
about the prior decision. Now, that decision may have been right at the
time and there now be a claim that, in fact, it is wrong to be applied
now. But the first question that we have to ask is: If we were deciding
the case today, if we were living in a kind of Garden of Eden and we
didn't have the precedent and this was the first case, would we decide it
the same way? If the answer is no, we would not do so, then we look to
a series of factors to try to decide how much value we ought to put on
that precedent even though it is not one that we particularly like or
would think appropriate in the first instance. One of the factors which
is very important I will throw together under the term of reliance. Who
has relied upon that precedent, and what does that reliance count for
today?...
We ask in some context whether private citizens in their lives have
relied upon it in their own planning to such a degree that, in fact, it
would be a great hardship in overruling it now. We look to whether
legislatures have relied upon it, in legislation which assumes the cor-
rectness of that precedent. We look to whether the court in question or
other courts have relied upon it, in developing a body of doctrine. If a
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precedent, in fact, is consistent with a line of development which ex-
tends from its date to the present time, then the cost of overruling that
precedent is, of course, going to be enormously greater and enor-
mously different from what will be the case in instances in which the
prior case either has not been followed or the prior case has simply
been eroded, chipped away at, as we say, by later determinations.
Beyond that, we look to such factors as the possibility of other
means of overruling the precedent. There is some difference, although
we may have trouble in weighting it, there is some difference between
constitutional and statutory interpretation precedent, which Congress
or a legislature can overrule, so we look to other possibilities. In all of
these instances, we are trying to give a fair weight to the claim of that
precedent to be followed today, even though in some respect we find it
deficient on the merits.
[133] If we are talking about a 5-to-4 decision that is 50 years old
and has spawned a body of consistent, supporting precedent which is
basically the foundation of the law that we have, the fact that it was 5
to 4 originally is a matter of small or no consequence at all. If, on the
other hand, we are talking about a 5-to-4 decision which was rendered
the year before and in between there are arguably inconsistent prece-
dents with it, then, of course, you are not going to be able to give it that
much weight. I suppose the real significance of its being 5 to 4 under
those circumstances is that if it were unanimous it is virtually unlikely
that there would be the arguably inconsistent precedents following it.
So I just think the numbers analysis standing by itself is a misleading
analysis.
[142] [C]onstitutional precedent is always, in theory, subject to re-
examination. Our theory of precedent tries to give some indication of
the force which a given precedent should have when reexamination is
requested.
[257] I accept as a general rule, just as you said, Senator, that
statutory interpretations are entitled to the highest claim to be fol-
lowed for the very reason that as statutory interpretations, if there is
anything wrong with them, legislatures-in this case, the Congress-
can take action to change them.
[258] I do not accept the position that never under any circum-
stances can a statutory interpretation be reexamined. I think "never" is
a pretty strong word. But there is very, very strong claim of precedent
to be followed in those circumstances.
[324] Q: Now, it is interesting that, in a matter of this sort, where
[your court] in 1984 had overruled a decision of [your court] from 1980,
and the case came up again in 1986, just 2 years later, and the court had
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seemed perfectly willing to change back and forth, that you found it
important to maintain the decision. Why? A: Because the case struck
me as a classic example of the kind of case in which there has got to be
an opportunity for reliance upon what the court does. We were dealing
in that case with the issuance of insurance policies. We have obligations
to both parties to those policies to come up with a coherent body of law
which can be understood and which those parties can rely upon in mak-
ing their business arrangements. We simply cannot go back and forth in
cases of that sort every couple of years, and therefore, I believed we
were in a situation in which the demand for reasonable reliance cer-
tainly outweighed my concern to go back andsort of rewrite the his-
tory... in the way that I would have done, if I had been able to that in
the first place.
Breyer: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[137] In respect to the constitutionality of the death penalty, it
seems to me that the Supreme Court has considered that matter for
quite a long time, in a large number of case. And indeed, if you look at
those cases, you will see that the fact that there are some circumstances
in which the death penalty is consistent with the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause of the Constitution is, in my opinion, settled law. At this
point it is settled.
[182] It [honesty in sentencing] is there; that is, the sentence given
is the sentence served, and I think that that has helped in the Federal
system; that is, I think people who understand the differences between
the Federal and the State systems have begun to understand that the
sentence that is given is the sentence that will be served, with very
few-15 percent leeway. That has helped.
[238] Insofar as you are suggesting that you have to remember
that privacy is what Brandeis said is the most civil and the most impor-
tant right of civilized people, and so forth, is a right that really is pro-
tected by the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches, unrea-
sonable seizures. Insofar as you are suggesting beware of fixed rules
interpreting that, because if you just follow fixed rules, you will dis-
cover that technology outdates the rules, and remember to protect the
basic value which might be threatened by some kind of technology that
we have not heard of, or that we have heard of but we didn't know
could get that far. I agree with that.
[239] Basically, we were in agreement about the rule of law that
the police and right, even without a warrant, to go look for that gun, if
they reasonably thought they were in danger. And the majority
thought, no, no, they are not in danger, because, after all, this guy is
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handcuffed to the bed. I thought, well, a handcuff, you know, a lot can
happen. I mean, they might say, "I want to go to the bathroom" and
they unlock it, he knows the gun is there, they do not, I don't know
how strong the bed is, and so in my mind is that the police were rea-
sonable in thinking that there was a danger; and they knew there was a
gun there and so thy ought to look for it.
[256] [regarding the exclusionary rule] [T]he basic idea, of course
is that it is very puzzling to people, very puzzling, what Cardozo said.
He said, "well, why should the criminal go free, because the constable
has blundered?" And the answer to that is, over the course of time and
a long period of time, people learned that the protection in the fourth
amendment, totally innocent people wouldn't be broken into in the
middle of the night, that confessions wouldn't be extracted through vio-
lence, that the only way to make those meaningful in practice was to
have this exclusionary rule. And it has become I think fairly widely ac-
cepted. The exact contours of it, and the shape and size and on the
border how it should look, and so forth, I recognize, but that is a matter
of considerable controversy and debate, and Congress or others might
well criticize or want to do it this way or that way or the other way.
[257] T]he great debate, as you recognize in this area, particularly
with the death penalty, is involved, is habeas corpus tells us we don't
want to have this or any person have a penalty particularly of this sort,
if the trial was fundamentally unfair. Of course, people keep coming on
again and again and they say, well, it was fundamentally unfair, and
then the courts say no, it was OK, and then they have a new reason and
a new reason and so the problem is this problem of delay. At the same
time, people might sometimes come up with reasons that they for good
cause couldn't present before. So I understand how you are trying to
balance those two things, the need for fundamental fairness and the
need to avoid unreasonable delay.
[360] I think that if in fact I could have read the statute, "three
prior convictions," to mean what you say-three prior convictions-the
case would have been much easier. The problem in the case arose from
the fact that you could not read it that way because the Supreme Court
had said at least some of those things that say "convictions" are not
convictions. They had said, for example, that one of those previous
convictions was a conviction that was obtained without the person hav-
ing a lawyer; then, it is not a conviction, even though it says "convic-
tion." So the dilemma-and this why it was so very difficult-is it as-
sumed by everybody, everybody agrees, that you cannot just read
"conviction" to mean conviction. Certain ones do not count. Those
without a lawyer, for example, do not count. And now the question is
are there some other ones that do not count. And the simplest thing
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seemed to me to be to say those that are unconstitutional do not count,
because if you do not do it that way, you would have to say there are
some unconstitutional convictions which are convictions, and there are
other unconstitutional convictions-those without a lawyer-which are
not convictions. And I did not understand how to draw that distinction.
Kennedy: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[113] Well, Senator, I do not think that there is a choice between
order and liberty. We can have both. Without ordered liberty, there is
no liberty at all. One of the highest priorities of society is to protect it-
self against the corruption and the corrosiveness and the violence of
crime. In my view judges must not shrink from enforcing the laws
strictly and fairly in the criminal area. They should not have an identity
crisis or self-doubts when they have to impose a severe sentence. It is
true that we have a system in this country of policing the police. We
have a system in this country that requires courts to reverse criminal
convictions when the defendant is guilty. We have a system in this
country under which relevant, essential, necessary, probative, convinc-
ing evidence is not admitted in the court because it was improperly
seized. This illustrates, I suppose, that constitutional rights are not
cheap. Many good things in life are not cheap and constitutional rights
are one of them. We pay a price for constitutional rights. My view of
interpreting these rules is that they should be pragmatic. They should
be workable.
[113] We have paid a very heavy cost to educate judges and police
officers throughout this country, and the criminal system works much
better than many people give it credit for .... On the other hand, it is
sometimes frustrating for the courts, as it is frustrating for all of us, to
enforce a rule in a hyper-technical way when the police or the prosecu-
tor have made a mistake in good faith. The good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule is one of the Court's recent pronouncements to try to
meet some of these concerns. It remains to be seen how workable that
exception is.
[136] I would like to underscore that I have not committed myself
as to the constitutionality of the death penalty. I have stated that if it is
found to be constitutional, it should be enforced.
[204] The purposes [of the exclusionary rule] are in the nature of a
deterrent. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to advise law en-
forcement officers in advance that if they do not follow the rules of the
fourth amendment, the evidence they seize is not going to be usable.
Now, if the rule goes beyond that point, and a police officer in all good
faith, after studying the rule, makes a snap decision that a warrant is
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valid, or a considered decision that a warrant is valid, then I think the
system out to give some recognition to that reasonable exercise of
judgment on his part.
[205] The Miranda rule, it seems to me, again, we have paid the
major cost by installing it. We have now educated law enforcement of-
ficers and prosecutors all over the country, and it has become almost
part of the criminal justice folklore .... Well, I think that since it is es-
tablished, it is entitled to great respect.
[205] Well, the Miranda rule, as I said, is in place. It was a sweep-
ing, sweeping rule. It wrought almost a revolution. It is not clear to me
that it necessarily followed from the words of the Constitution. Yet it is
in place now, and I think it is entitled to great respect .... I think
[Miranda] went to the verge of the law.
[220] I have indicated that the decisions of the Warren Court went
to the very verge of the law at least. We are talking about criminal pro-
cedure cases, the ones we have mentioned. That we have paid a heavy
cost for imposing those rules on the criminal system; that they seem to
be part of our constitutional system now; and that I think a very strong
argument would have to be mounted in order to withdraw those deci-
sions. I do think the decisions have evinced on an explicit basis, the fact
that they involve pragmatic, preventative rules announced by the
Court, and the Court itself has admitted that they are not necessarily
demanded by the Constitution.
[233] Well, I guess we disagree on whether [the constitutionality
of the death penalty] is well settled. These decisions are very close. ...
I have indicated that in my view, if [the death penalty] is held constitu-
tional it should be swiftly and efficiently enforced. I recognize also that
capital punishment is recognized in the Constitution, in the 5th
amendment.
Thomas: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[133] The death penalty is the harshest penalty that can be im-
posed, and it is certainly one that is unchangeable. And we should be
most concerned about providing all the rights and all the due process
that can be provided and should be provided to individuals who may
face that kind of a consequence. I would be concerned, of course, that
we would move too fast, that if we eliminate some of the protections
that perhaps we may deprive that individual of his life without due
process. So I would be in favor of reasonable restrictions on proce-
dures, but not to the point that individuals-or I believe that there
should be reasonable restrictions at some point, but not the point that
an individual is deprived of his constitutional protections.
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[133] Of course, we would like to make sure that the victims [of
crimes] are involved in the process, but we should be very careful, in
my view, that we don't somehow undermine the validity of the process;
that an individual who is a criminal defendant is in some way harmed
by that other than just simply getting it right and making sure that the
total impact of the conduct is known. I think that there are concerns on
both sides. From the standpoint of the victims, that is important. But
there are also the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant.
[135] I think that the court and the law enforcement community
have come to accept the use of the exclusionary rule up to a point, and
the court is looking for ways to make sure that the purposes of the ex-
clusionary rule are advanced, as opposed to simply being used in a way
that is rote.
[423] Philosophically, Senator, there is nothing that would bother
me personally about upholding [the death penalty] in appropriate
cases. My concern, of course, would always be that we provide all of
the available protections and accord all of the protections available to a
criminal defendant who is exposed to or sentenced to the death pen-
alty.
Rehnquist: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[CJ-211] [T]he constitutional rights of the defendants are essential
and vital. But they also stand against the right of society and limit the
right of society, in the traditional view of criminal law, to apprehend
the guilt and exonerate the innocent. And obviously, it was intended
that the Bill of Rights have this restrictive function, but I have ex-
pressed the view in my opinions that this endless expansion of constitu-
tional rights for defendants by judicial construction is not a welcomed
thing because it does tend to impair in a way that the Constitution did
not intend to have it impaired, the right of society to fairly and justly
administer criminal law, with proper respect not just for the defendant,
but for the victim and for the social interest in seeing the law enforced.
[AJ-43] I made the statement saying that the abandonment of the
field arrest procedures and the consequent, or perhaps not necessarily
consequent, delay in bringing the defendants before an arresting magis-
trate, or a committing magistrate, was, I thought, defensible because
the requirements that a defendant be brought before a magistrate were
that he be brought before the magistrate within a reasonable time, and
that in my opinion a reasonable time in this situation should take into
consideration the necessity of the arresting officer, having made the ar-
rest, continuing to be in the field to prevent the occurrence of other
violence.
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[AJ-44] I do not think arresting without probable cause is ever
proper...
[AJ-44] It suggests to me that whereas there may have been
probably cause for the arrest of the great number of people, the... po-
lice were faced with such as overwhelming situation of violation of law
that they chose to try to keep the streets free, and rather than to pre-
serve the necessary information that would enable them to later show
either that there had been probable cause for an arrest, or probable
cause to bind a man over.
[AJ-45] I think the one thing that happened was that the number
of people who were involved... was an overwhelmingly large num-
ber .... As a result, they were faced with a choice of either, when an
individual policeman arrested a law violator, or someone he thought
was a law violator, of himself taking that man to a stationhouse, book-
ing him, and going through the usual procedures, or simply having the
man taken in some other manner to the stationhouse. And the police-
man then would stay on the streets to try to arrest the next bunch who
were coming along. And as I understand it, they were very deliberately
trying to obstruct the movement of traffic, frequently by hazardous
means. I think the... police opted in favor of the latter choice, and I
cannot find it in myself to fault them for it.
[AJ-67] I think, from the law enforcement point of view, we were
skeptical of the notion that some sort of judicial hearing should be re-
quired before an investigation be even undertaken which, I think,
would have the most deleterious effect on effective law enforcement, in
effect, preventing the commencement of an investigation which might
ultimately end up in a showing of probable cause before the investiga-
tion could even start.
[AJ-139] Senator, I have made public statements... in support of
the constitutionality of pretrial detention. ...
Stevens: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[56] I also place an extremely high value on the interests protected
by the due process clause insofar as it guarantees fair procedure to
every defendant.
[75] I have had occasion to write at least one opinion in what was
a rather severe attempt by the prosecutor to make use of information
in an arrest, or maybe he was trying to use a misdemeanor, for im-
peachment purposes which we thought was clearly improper, and I
have also written an opinion on the subject to the extent to which a
prior conviction is properly used for impeachment purposes when the
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defendant elects to testify in his own behalf, and we have expressed
concern about the use of convictions.
[76-77] The closest one [opinion that I have written] that I can re-
call was a case involving the execution of a search warrant which pur-
suant to a statute authorized entry into a domicile if entry had been re-
fused. The officers knocked down the door, and a few seconds later,
busted it down, and entered a home and conducted a search. We found
that the waiting of an interval of 2 or 3 seconds did not constitute con-
sent.
[77] I think it is true that the public sometimes has difficulty un-
derstanding why evidence which tends to establish guilt in a fairly con-
vincing way must be excluded from trial, it is somewhat inconsistent
with the truth determining function of the trial, but of course the coun-
tervailing value at stake is the great interest in the privacy of the citizen
and the concern that, unless the exclusionary rule is enforced, there
may not be an adequate deterrent to police conduct which none of us
would approve. So again there is a tension here.
[78] I don't hesitate in saying that I think one of the most impor-
tant aspects of procedural fairness is availability of counsel to the liti-
gant on either side. I could not overemphasize the importance of the
lawyer's role in the adversary process and it is unquestionably a matter
of major importance in all litigation.
O'Connor: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[73] I think it is a serious concern to a lot of people that there is no
finality in the criminal justice field to a given decision, even after an
appeal has been heard and resolved, long after the conviction in ques-
tion, and even after one series of post-conviction petitions for relief,
there are others that can be followed in an unending series. I think that
is one thing that has caused the public to have some concern about the
proper function of the judicial system in that area.
[79] [T]he exclusionary rule, of course, is one that has caused gen-
eral public discontent on occasion with the function of the criminal jus-
tice system, to the extent that perfectly valid, relevant evidence is ex-
cluded solely on the basis that it was obtained in violation of some
occasionally technical requirement.
[80] It [the exclusionary rule] is in fact I think a judge-made rule
as opposed to one of constitutional dimensions, as I understand it. As a
result, the Supreme Court presumably could alter that judge-made rule
without doing violence to some constitutional provision or principle.
There have been expressions by several sitting Justices that they would
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like to reexamine that. I think the rule may well come before the Court
and could well be the subject of a reexamination.
[129] If people have been previously convicted of offenses and
these convictions are known, or if for example someone has been
charged with an offense and released on bail and then charged again
with another offense and these factors in the record are known, these
things perhaps-speaking purely as a matter of personal belief and not
as a reflection on the legal issues involved-possibly merit considera-
tion in the determination of bail.
[146] My experience.., is that the application of Miranda has not
resulted in an inability of the police to still be reasonably successful in
their efforts to gain information and obtain statements. It has, no
doubt, precluded some but on a broad, general basis I cannot say that I
think the police have been unable to cope with it.
[146-147] I think the exclusionary rule, from my simple observa-
tion. . ., has proven to be much more difficult in terms of the admini-
stration of justice. There are times when perfectly relevant evidence
and, indeed, sometimes the only evidence in the case has been ex-
cluded by application of a rule which, if different standards were ap-
plied maybe would not have been applied in that situation, for instance,
to good faith conduct on the part of the police. I am not suggesting, and
do not want to be interpreted as suggesting that I think it is inappropri-
ate where force or trickery or some other reprehensible conduct has
been used but I have seen examples of the application of the rule which
I thought were unfortunate....
[1471 I would not think that the Miranda rule has actually affected
the crime rate. Conceivably, the exclusionary rule has had some effect
in some areas of the crime rate, possibly drug enforcement.
[166] But we must, I think, within the judicial system itself strive
constantly to resolve criminal cases rapidly. I think delay in that area
simply promotes a disillusionment of people with the ability of the sys-
tem to function. So we have to be concerned about the speed in which
we handle these matters. I think we have to be concerned within the
judicial branch about at what point we can say that a case has been
fairly litigated and fairly reviewed on appeal or on post-conviction re-
view and now it is at an end. There must be some way to more effec-
tively do that. That has to be a concern of people on the bench as well
as legislators. We have to be concerned, I suppose, with the imposition
of fair and appropriate remedies. It will always be a concern, I am sure,
to judges on the bench that there are appropriate facilities in which to
place convicted defendants if an incarcerative sentence is appropriate.
We have to be concerned, I think, with insuring that there is the power
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at least to order those who are convicted to make restitution in appro-
priate instances and the means of enforcing that.
[204] My experience with the criminal justice system has resulted
in some disappointments in the lack of effectiveness; the recidivism
rate is extremely high, and the crime rate generally is extremely high.
We have to ask why .... If there is a way to provide more prison space,
it is evident that there is a great need for that at both the State and the
Federal level.
[211] [W]ithout expressing any opinion on the eighth amendment
implications, if any, I am generally in favor of giving trial judges discre-
tion to impose lengthy sentences if necessary, including up to life sen-
tences, for repeat offenders. That concept seems to me to be generally
a valid one. It has been my observation that a life sentence can be a lot
shorter in actuality than a lengthy term of years. Be that as it may, I
think discretion is appropriate.
Scalia: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[34] As to the second part [of your question], Senator, what do I
think of [Miranda] warnings, I am happy to answer it as a policy mat-
ter, assuming the question is not, you know, what do I think as to the
extent to which those warnings, in one circumstance or another, are re-
quired by the Constitution. As a policy matter, I think-as far as I
know, everybody thinks-it is a good idea to warn a suspect of his
rights as soon as it is practicable. I do not know of anyone who thinks it
should be otherwise.
[35] Q: Would you favor some limitation on the extent of the
number of post-trial appeals which allow inmates under death sen-
tences to avoid executions for years after the commission of their
crimes? A: Well, Senator, nobody likes frivolous appeals, I suppose, in
any matter, criminal or civil. But to the extent that your question is ask-
ing about legislation, I should not have a view about it.
[87] Q: What about the speedy trial, public trial and jury trial pro-
visions of the 6th amendment; are they incorporated under the due
process clause? A: Indeed.
[87-88] Q: And impartial trial, notice of charges, confrontation,
compulsory process, right to counsel, under the 6th amendment [and
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 8th amendment]; are
they incorporated by the due process clause of the 14th amendment?
A: That is what the cases have held, and it would be massive change to
go back on them.
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Ginsburg: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[217] One of the things that I have done every other year with my
law clerks ... is to visit the local jail and ... the nearest penitentiary.
We visited ... the facility for the criminally insane .... I do that to ex-
pose myself to those conditions, and also for my law clerks. Most of
them will go on to practice in large law firms specializing in corporate
business, and won't see the law as it affects most people. That is one of
the things I do to stay in touch.
[229-230] One of the cases in which I participated-a decision the
Supreme Court reversed-might serve as an example. The case in-
volved the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court had decided that if
police officers stop a car, open the trunk and find a suitcase in it, they
can't open the suitcase without a warrant. Cases then trooped before
the lower courts involving other containers in cars-cardboard boxes
and plastic bags, for example. Lower courts began to draw a "luggage
line"; some applied a "worthy container" doctrine to determine when
police officers needed a warrant. One was needed for a leather suit-
case, for sure; lower courts were not so sure about lesser containers.
My court, in that time of uncertainty, got the case of a leather pouch
and a paper bag, side-by-side in a car trunk. The three-judge panel held
that the police needed a warrant before they could open the leather
pouch, but didn't need a warrant to open the paper bag, because it was
a flimsy, unworthy container. I wrote an opinion for the full court say-
ing we have now seen an array of container cases, going from the
leather suitcase to the lowly paper bag, and we can't expect police offi-
cers to make worthy container judgments on the spot. Either you can
open a container or you can't without a warrant. Because the Supreme
Court held that police officers could not open a suitcase without a war-
rant, my court held police could not open any closed container without
a warrant.
[263] Q: Do you believe ... that the death penalty under all cir-
cumstances ... is incompatible with the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment? A: At least since 1972 and,
if you date it from Furman, even earlier, the Supreme Court, by large
majorities, has rejected the position that the death penalty under any
and all circumstances is unconstitutional .... I can tell you that I do not
have a closed mind on this subject. I don't think it would be consistent
with the line I have tried to hold to tell you that I will definitely accept
or definitely reject any position. I can tell you that I am well aware of
the precedent, and I have already expressed my views on the value of
precedent.
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[296] Q: [Is it] improper for a trial court ... to impose a harsher
sentence on a defendant who chooses to exercise his or her constitu-
tional right to a trial rather than plead guilty? A: You can't punish
someone for exercising a constitutional right. If you punish someone
for exercising a constitutional right, that person has no right.
[327] [327] The purpose of the Miranda warnings is to make cer-
tain that a defendant's rights are known to the defendant, so the defen-
dant can exercise them-the right not to speak and the information
that, if you do, your words can be used against you, the right to an at-
torney and the knowledge that if you are unable to pay for counsel, a
lawyer will be provided for you by the State. Those, it seems to me, are
constitutional rights that should be brought home to every defendant.
Now, sophisticated defendants will know them without being told, but
the unsophisticated won't. This practical approach, the Miranda warn-
ings, has become familiar to all, thanks to television. I think it has
worked.
[315-316] Q: How do you feel about the mandatory [minimum]
penalties? Are they putting too much discretion over sentencing in the
hands of prosecutors, and not in the hands of judges? A: [T]here was
recently published a very intelligent comment by Judge Weinstein of
the Eastern District of New York concerning mandatory sentences. He
recommended appointment of a commission to do a careful study of
how they are working out in practice. The perception is very strong
among many judges ... that it is deceptive to think discretion has been
removed. It has indeed been removed from the sentencing judges, be-
cause mandatory minimums don't give the judges any choice .... So
the judges' sense is that the discretion has been transferred from them
to the prosecutor, who can choose to indict for a lesser weight [of a
drug] than the weight actually found at the time the defendant was ar-
rested. There is much concern that these mandatory minimum sen-
tences are transferring discretion from the judge to the prosecutor and
that they may be deceptive in other respects, because the likelihood of
apprehension-not the sentence length-may be the strongest deter-
rent .... So I think the time has come when a study, a close look at
how mandatory minimums have been working would make a contribu-
tion of great value.
[335-336] I can only tell you the code of conduct I would adopt for
myself wherever I am, here or abroad, and that is the Constitution of
the United States. I would consider it binding on me. I can perhaps cite
an example. [A] former Federal judge ... was sent to judge a hijacking
in Berlin. It was a sensitive case in the international community. A
plane was hijacked from Poland, I believe, to take people who had
been in East Germany into West Germany. The hijacking presented a
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sensitive question within Germany. So a court that had been created in
World War II, called the United States Court for Berlin, was resur-
rected, and a U.S. district judge, Judge Stern was sent there. He was
told by the State Department that the alleged hijackers would have
only such rights as the State Department chose to give them. Judge
Stern, said, I am a Federal judge, the Constitution is my law, and that is
the law I am going to apply in any proceeding over which I preside. He
made sure that the defendants had very able counsel ... and that they
got the full panoply of rights we accord criminal defendants .... It is a
wonderful example, I think, of the way any Federal official should be-
have at home or abroad. The Constitution and the Federal law should
be our guide wherever we are.
Souter: Rights of Criminal Defendants
[178] I was in law enforcement once, and there were times when I
used to chafe over the difficulty that law enforcement had in conform-
ing to some of the [Supreme Court's] decisions. One of the things I am
glad of is that that is an era which has, in large measure, passed. We do
not have the same problems that we had 20 years ago. There are some
who would say there is a greater pragmatic appreciation on the Su-
preme Court.... We have learned to live with much in the last 20 years,
and we have lived with it reasonably well.
[205] [T]he basis for the exclusionary rule [as explained in Mapp
v. Ohio] was to induce the police, to induce the executive branch of the
government from engaging in activities which violated 4th amendment
rights, and the theory was that if the police could not profit, if the
prosecution could not profit by using evidence illegally seized, there
would therefore be an inducement to avoid seizing evidence illegally,
so that the object of the exclusionary rule as a means to enforce the
values of the fourth amendment was a very pragmatic one. But the fo-
cus of that explanation was, of course, on police conduct .... [W]hat
the Leon case is saying is that if the mistake which leads us to conclude
that there has been a 4th amendment violation was a mistake not made
by the police, but made by the judge or a magistrate who issued the
warrant, that should not preclude the introduction of evidence on the
theory described in Mapp. If the mistake is not the police's mistake,
then you gain nothing in influencing police conduct by keeping the evi-
dence out .... I think the Leon rule is entirely consistent with the ra-
tionale for the exclusionary rule in Mapp.
[208] I would not take the position, I do not think anyone takes
the position that sentences have got to be imposed absolutely, without
judicial discretion. But I do think very strongly that the judicial discre-
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tion which is exercised in sentencing should be a very structured and
disciplined discretion, otherwise the problem of disparity in sentencing
is simply insoluable.... My concern about the effectiveness of this
perception of injustice is not limited simply to the perception of the
public. I think there should be an equal concern for the perception of
the defendants who are sentenced. If there is going to be any hope for
any rehabilitative effect in sentencing, particularly on young and early
offenders, it seems to me it has got to rest upon a reasonable percep-
tion that the system in which the sentence has been imposed is itself a
fair system.
[208] [T]here was for a long time, certainly in the early years in
which I was practicing law and engaged in the criminal justice system,
an unspoken feeling that somehow the white collar criminal should at
least get one free chance or the feeling that the white collar criminal,
even when caught, should never in fact be sentenced to incarceration.
This seemed to me was both morally unjust and socially indefensible.
[226-228] Q: Your dissenting opinion seemed to recognize the im-
portance of the State's interest [in detecting drunk drivers]. I would
appreciate it if you could explain your reasoning. A: I think one of the
points of common ground from which all of the parties and all of those
with strong opinions on that case begin is that when there is a stop for a
sobriety checkpoint, there is, to a very limited degree, a search and sei-
zure and inquiry subject to 4th amendment standards .... What ... the
court did-and what, indeed, I did in my dissent-was to engage basi-
cally in an analysis which balanced the State and the private interests
involved to determine whether the stop and the inquiry could be re-
garded as a reasonable one within the standards applicable to search
and seizures .... What we are particularly concerned with in these
kinds of cases is that the discretion of the police be something other
than an uncontrolled roving ... The concern is to require a very tightly
controlled discretion on the part of the police ... which does not go
one iota beyond what is necessary to satisfy the public interest in de-
tecting driving under the influence before a tragedy occurs .... I said
that in judging what is reasonable, we have to take into consideration
the potential danger which the activity poses and the State's expression
of that danger by its decision to regulate or not to regulate it. And what
might, indeed, be a perfectly reasonable inquiry in a highly dangerous
and regulated activity, like driving, would not be reasonable at all in an
innocent pursuit like walking down Main Street and doing errands.
And I therefore concluded that there was not a danger, that a sobriety
checkpoint approval under the 4th amendment was going to be taken
as thin end of the wedge for an assault on civil liberties. I think that
view has since been recognized.
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[248] I recognize that, as a simple matter of the text, the Constitu-
tion of the United States recognizes capital punishment. Beyond that,
given the fact that there will be capital punishment cases before the
Court and I believe are on its docket now, I do not think I can go very
far on a discussion, without getting into something that is going to be
before the Court.
[280] [T]he issue that we had to confront in that case is whether to
recognize that there are certain constitutional rights of a defendant,
which are indeed so personal and fundamental that they may not be
waived by someone on the defendant's behalf, that they would be ex-
ceptions to the general rule the defendant is bound by decisions of
counsel, and we held in that case that the right of a trial by a full jury
was indeed just such a right, and because the defendant had not on the
record indicated a waiver of his right to 12, we reversed the conviction.
